

Paragraph summaries of and quotations from

THE DESIRE OF THE NATIONS

Oliver O'Donovan

CUP 1996

Preface to the paperback edition – Dec 1998

“I set out to discover the kingship of Christ, and ended up, as I am told, with a ‘defence of Christendom.’” ix

however, “The discussion of Christendom should be read, perhaps, not so much as a defence, but as a word of advice to its would-be critics.” ix

This book as a ‘political theology’. Another part needed – a ‘political ethics’. ix (see also xi)

Prologue pp.1-5

- 1.1 The political language of the *Te Deum*. A ruler ... achieved liberation ... founded and sustained a community. “And at its centre is the breathtakingly unpolitical image of the Virgin’s womb.” 1
- 1.2 Two ways of taking this:
 1. ‘place the public business of our human communities upon a surer foundation’ 1-2
 2. ‘cancel it out, turning the language of political power back against itself, so allowing us to conceive of a God above and beyond politics’ 1-2
- 2.1 Take the first of these – ‘political theology’ – God has a real kingdom and human kingdoms are meant to follow and further that. And God’s kingdom and analogous human kingdoms meet in real history “that finds its goal in Christ, ‘the desire of the nations’.” 2
- 2.2 Take the second – the ‘keep them separate’ view. How do politics and religion relate in this? Even in this view there are links – e.g.
 - politics as source of religious imagery
 - religion shaping politics through the safe channel of the ethics of the motivations of the players:

“Ethics, especially an ethics of interior motivation, provides a safe mediation, insulated against theocratic misunderstanding, by which religion may make politics more honest without presuming to make it more divine.” 2-3
- 3.1 ‘Political theology’ (#1. above) at its best when it flows from / is demanded by doing mainstream theological topics properly –when we are “letting theology be true to its task and freeing it from a forced and unnatural detachment” then it will be theological. “Theology must be political if it is to be evangelical.” 3
- 3.2 Sometimes, of course, political theology is done because people tired of talking of God – so talk politics instead. But real political theology is seen to be such because the political aspects of it return to and re-illumine the main theological topics – sin, grace, God etc
- 4.1 The term ‘political theology’ – where from and what legitimately applied to?
- 4.2 There’s a gt tradition of political theology (high point 1100-1650) and massive ignorance of it. “the relation of the contemporary political theology to the tradition can be summed up in a single bleak word: ignorance.” 4
- 4.3 Why this neglect? The “modern separation of politics and theology and the suspicions that produced it.” – 5. Subject of chapter 1.

Chapter One: *Beyond Suspicion* pp.6-29

Ethics, politics and the practice of suspicion pp.6-12

Political Concepts pp.12-21

Israel and the reading of the Scriptures pp.21-29

***Ethics, politics and the practice of suspicion* pp.6-12**

- 6.1 Two suspicions shape the modern separation of politics and theology
- 6.2 Suspicion 1: politics corrupts theology. (Kant) that political theology wd be a contrived legitimization of power, a forged morality. "Politicians are corruptors of moral discourse". (6)
"This unmasking of political morality [DF which is aim of first suspicion] is what sets a distance between the Christian West and the Aristotelian conception of ethics as a subdivision of politics." (6)
- 6.3 Two sides to this:
a) this is a forged morality whereas a true one wd not be pushed around by politicians
b) this is contingent, particularized and therefore arbitrary - need transcendent standpoint
- 7.1 b) above is a Xn critique - e.g. from Augustine. Has a place to stand - "could point to a divine authority and a more lasting social order (*City of God* 4.3.4). Unmasking supposes a theological point of vantage, essentially an eschatological one." Xns critique of political morality "as if we were God's spies" (Lear, v.3) (7)
- 7.2 What Kant says of 'morality' also true of political 'theology'. Christian suspicion of this too. But if no place to stand then what happens ... "But to the moralist of modernity, wielding the inner criticism of reflective consciousness rather than the public criticism of the church's theology, this critique is directed categorically against all postures which unite theological and political judgments. The suspicion has become total." (7-8)
- 8.1 Suspicion 2: theology overwhelms politics. "Religion seemed a threat to political freedom." (8)
- 8.2 17th C shift: "In the seventeenth century philosophy came to lose confidence in the objectivity of final causes ... now there arose a tradition of explaining societies entirely by reference to efficient causes Individual agents had their ends; but objective structures only had their origins. Moral purposes and goals, questions of human virtue and fulfilment, seemed intrusive, another form of theocratic temptation." (8) "The internalising of morality, then, led modernity once again to radicalise its suspicions." (8)
- 8.3 The two suspicions (once contradictory) have fused - joined in the simple conclusion that all relationship between politics and theology is under suspicion. "the division has become internalised. Each of us has a mind partitioned by a frontier, and accepts responsibility for policing it." (9) "the paradigm for late-modern liberal culture." (9)
- 9.1 "The Southern school" has challenged the separation. But has done so from a particular critical standpoint which allows both suspicions. And "the matrix is political, not ethical. For it is the *social* dynamisms of history that provide a context in which moral commitments become intelligible." (9)

Incidental: "Epochs are characterised not by positions but by debates; it is the way they state their disagreements rather than their agreements that that binds the thinkers of any age together." (9)
- 9.2 But the price for this is the loss of absolute authority - everything is under suspicion. "Ethics ... is deprived of authority when it is made to serve merely a reactive critical function. It degenerates into little more than a rhetoric of scepticism." (10) But then the critic is under suspicion and so on *ad infinitum*. "Each generation of God's spies has to settle for being spied on by the next. No one can have the last word." (10)
- 10.1 Sociology doesn't help - as an endlessly suspicious and transcendence-denying discipline it is actually anti-political: "A politics that does not encompass the direction of society ceases to be a politics at all. But there is no room for direction in a society ruled by the imperative of universal suspicion." (10)
- 10.2 Actually liberation theology was theologically mandated but it was weakened by its own method which invited total suspicion. "The true weakness lies not in taking up the cause of the poor in a preferential manner, but in partially concealing the theological warrants for doing so in order to conform to the

historical dialectic of idealism. By relying on the deconstructive 'cui bono?' question to empower its rejection of liberal secularism, political theology found itself with an unsustainable combination of political affirmation and universal suspicion. It became tied in to the eternally inconclusive exchanges of historicism: allegations of sectional interest volleyed to and fro across the net, never to be ruled out of court, never to land beyond reach of return." (11)

- 11.1 The 'cui bono?' question has little usefulness - "Once totalised, criticism merely evacuates itself of content and turns into a series of empty gestures. One cannot gain a truer understanding of the world by criticism alone, any more than one can make a dish of mince with a grinder and nothing to put through it. Totalised criticism is the modern form of intellectual innocence - not a harmless innocence, unhappily, for, by elevating suspicion to the dignity of a philosophical principle, it destroys trust and makes it impossible to learn." (11)
- 11.2 God actually doesn't have spies - he has prophets. And they do not merely criticize false prophets - they have the word of the Lord to proclaim. Criticism and vision. The prophet needs a point of view.

Political Concepts pp.12-21

- 12.1 So, looking for epistemological freedom / a place to stand. Some efforts been made with
 - a) knowledge won from action - but that looks like Western tech-l doctrine of progress
 - b) knowledge won from suffering - but that looks like Enlightenment/romantic world-renunciationand so neither of these worked. Knowledge gained in obedient action was what was really needed.
- 12.2 Word about Gutiérrez. Latterly says that "The ultimate criteria come from revealed truth, which we accept in faith, and not from praxis itself. It is meaningless ... tautology ... to say that praxis itself is to be criticised 'in the light of praxis'." (Gut - *Truth make Free*, p.101 q 12)

Incidental: when no absolute criterion - "the whole Promethean self-positing of mankind against God as meaningless, which is to say that sin is meaningless." (12-13)
- 13.1 Gut not consistent. Certainly big problems with the praxis idea. When boiled down to it, since is praxis then raises question: "Is knowledge by which human beings 'recreate the world and shape themselves' really knowledge any more, or simply will?" (13)
- 13.2 Consider phrase, "reflecting upon praxis". Need deliberation - reasoning towards a particular action. And reflection - understanding world we are acting in. Obedience to God's transcendent word in between the two. But if knowledge gained in action then we have pre-empted revelation and there's no chance of repentance which is the acknowledgement of the wrongness of an action against a prior standard.
- 14.1 Debate over whether knowledge arises retrospectively (Hegel) or in the heat of the action. (Marx). But the view of ethics behind this - as though can have ethical principles independent of the situation. On the contrary, how you understand and describe the situation is itself major part of ethics. "No deliberative question can be answered without a description of the situation to which is put." In fact, "the world-shaping, cultural sins have to do with bad descriptions: of sexual intercourse as a merely physical encounter; of deterrence as a threat that does not commit one to consequent action; of a foetus as a piece of maternal tissue; of justice as the will of the majority, and so on." (14)
- 14.2 And describing the situation of politics is even harder than most - the phenomena themselves keep changing - tribe, empire, kingdom, bureaucratic state etc. And can talk about different dimensions - politics as power, as justice, as extension of the home, as construct of the market-place etc. "Before political *ethics* can begin the, there must be a work of descriptive theory Political theology ... must precede political ethics." (14-15)
- 15.1 The need, therefore, for precise, distinct political concepts.
- 15.2 Sourced from or authorised by Scripture. "Theory has to respond to the concepts found in Scripture, and its adequacy as theology will be measured by how well it has responded to them."
- 16.1 Southern school, in addition to biblical concepts, borrowed some from elsewhere. That's not wholly illegit but needs to be done judiciously. Class-conflict analysis wasn't helpful. Dependency theory has been illuminating, etc.

- 16.2 But problem with borrowing from social science is that it has already decided to speak of society separate from government and of institutions separate from their teloi. Social scientific conceptuality, then, is restrictive.
- 16.3 So Southern school has paid all too little attention to the issue of authority. Whereas in the North, this is the key issue - not only now but as a central theme in pre-modern political theology.
- 17.1 Now when mention issue of authority it raises "a massive deployment of suspicion". Moderns are dead scared that start talking about that and you'll end up making moral judgments: they have "kept their silence, not knowing how to address the topic without abandoning the posture of totalised criticism and returning to 'legitimation'." (17)
- 17.2 An example of this difficulty of totalised suspicion and mentioning authority - from ECUSA liturgy. "We are offered a vision of political responsibility in a vacuum..." (17) About striving for justice and peace but dare not mention laws and institutions.
- 17.3 Contrast Cranmer. (18→) can't avoid the issue. "Nothing in modern democracy has changed the fact that political existence depends upon structures of command and obedience." (18) Moderns just won't talk about it.
- 18.1 So since Southern school are main/best political theologians of late and since they have not addressed authority issues and since Northern theologians are scared to, there's a bunch of real questions that just don't get talked about.
- 18.2 Cd get some leads from the Elluls, George Grants, Leo Strausses and Alasdair MacIntyres of the world).
- 19.1 Let's talk about the reign of God - it's an authority thing. "A central theme in what follows is that theology, by developing its account of the reign of God, may recover the ground traditionally held by the notion of authority." (19) By placing political history within the history of God's reign we get three advantages:
- 19.2 advantage 1: is world-affirming - the authority we're talking about is God's moral rule not bare power.
- 19.3 this flows from and expands *Resurrection and Moral Order*. Arg't there was that God's moral order is discerned in a real history - that of the resurrection. Affirms both the reality of history and the reality of a standard for history - won't separate them. Same applies here to politics. "True ethics ... is also grounded in *that* politics, which is the politics of the divine rule."
- 20.1 advantage 2: talking of reign of God gets us beyond obsession with institutional forms (which are variable) to the heart of the matter - the **political act**. "The political act is the divinely authorised act restore to the idea of authority its proper depth as a moment of vocation. It can reorient the focus of political understanding to the innovative moment in which God calls on us to act not only on our own behalf but on behalf of others and in their name." (20)
- 20.2 Have Paul Ramsey to thank for seeing the central importance of the act
- 21.1 advantage 3: reign of God is presented as a *revealed* history - this becomes a measure for all other understandings of history. That's what next section is about.

Israel and the reading of the Scriptures pp.21-29

- 21.2 Southern school exciting because it arose from a reading of the Bible. "The adventure into political questioning was driven by the energy of biblical discovery." (21)
- 21.3 So even though v different sit-n and qns from North, will be relevant - theology is one and many: "There is a paradoxical truth about sameness and difference in Christian theology. Since no context is the same as any other, no one theological undertaking will exactly mirror another; and yet as each enterprise takes seriously its own authorisation in the Gospel of Jesus Christ, it will find that it is in a symbiotic relation to every other enterprise that does do. ... Theology is a manifold witness, which has a unified object on which it concentrates its witness." (21)
- 22.1 We need to read the whole Bible - and with a theological reading. Not just few passages or odd words.
- 22.2 Talking re shalom or jubilee or exodus isn't enough. Need integration and wholeness.

- 22.3 It's there - the vocab of OT is political: "Almost the whole vocabulary of salvation in the NT has a political pre-history of some kind ..." - salvation, justification, peace, faithfulness, the Kingdom of God. "Israel's knowledge of God's blessings was, from beginning to end, a political knowledge, and it was out of that knowledge that the evangelists and apostles spoke about Jesus." (23)

But how far is there continuity in this conceptual world/vocab? Pss are not gospels. Hebrew is not Gk. The hope of the early church is not the hope of Israel. Israel is not a nation in the 1st C AD in the same way as in the 8th C BC.

- 23.1 See what early church did to Israel's political hope:
- "negatively" - take as symbolic of "spiritual" (beyond the public realm), "heart" blessings
- "positively" - assume will get fulfilled through rule of Christ on earth
- 24.1 "These two hermeneutic options, negative and positive, are foreshadowed in the NT itself." (24)
Example of former - Hebrews (everything in OT was symbolic, temporary). Example of latter - accounts of Palm Sunday - Jesus is Davidic king.
- 24.2 These appear contradictory - they are not. They complement because both understand that Israel's history points to further realities: "complement one another in the elaboration of a theology of promise and fulfillment." (25)
- 25.1 Paul shows us the both-and of this. e.g law - has been and has not been superseded. Or institution: "This age is not one empty of public witness to God's work, a mere space for faith in which all social forms are indifferent; but neither does the church itself and on its own constitute the sole public sign." (25)
- Actually, the "church appears rather undressed politically [but there is] ... an unrealised promise for the full socialisation [DF - making into public, social and institutional reality] of God's believing people." (25)
- So this both-and; this continuity - discontinuity thing means: "This means that any question about social forms and structures must be referred to a normative critical standard: do they fulfil that will of God for human society to which Israel's forms authoritatively point us?" (25)
- 25.2 How these streams diverge and develop:
a) pietism - Tertullian - idealist
b) theocracy - Eusebius - realist
- 26.1 a) John Wyclif as example. "founded his doctrine of political right on the concept of dominion by grace" [dominion = property and jurisdiction]. Only the elect, the renewed, those who will live by law of love really have political right. This is radical and undermining.
- 26.2 b) 16th C thomists - Vitoria and the Salamanca school. Continuitist, natural law of politics, based on creation. (Which could be and later was secularized). Unrevolutionary.
- 26.3 These two in contrast. Wyclif's has immediacy; Vitoria's has stability. "The tension between the two traditions needs the mediation of a political order which *itself* discloses and reveals the judging presence of God in society." Cos this will have the revealedness of Wycliff and the do-ability / realisability of Vitoria. Israel is that historically real but divinely ordered revelation. "Failure to attend to Israel is what left Christian political thought oscillating between idealist and realist poles." (27)
- 27.1 So there it is: Israel is the unique political entity through which God made known his purposes in the world. Or "the governing principle is the kingly rule of God, expressed in Israel's corporate existence and brought to final effect in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus." (27). Four herm-1 principles in reading Israel politically:
- 27.2 (i) if Israel's polit trad is normative it must be read as *history*. Take devts seriously. Don't just pick out shalom, jubilee, coronation service. Don't appeal to exodus re deliverance of poor and forget conquest of Canaan. Don't appeal to republicanism of amphictyony and forget monarchy is coming.
- 28.1 (ii) don't try to find a subversive counter-history underneath and behind the text. "have done with perpetual unmasking." (28)

- 28.2 (iii) don't read like a Whig or historicist - inevitable progress. This "makes the process of history the sole content of history The past is recalled solely to justify the present against it and has no standing point of disclosure."
- 29.1 (iv) must be read as a history of *redemption*. (iii) above does not mean there's no purpose but that "the theological coherence is allowed to arise from within the history and is not imposed upon it from the existing norms of our own historical period." (29) What the purpose is must be told us by the prophets and apostles.
- 29.2 Relation between narrative and theology; between history and truth. Narrative used to tell about relations of things. And in narrative, discern truths. Explore the narrative, discern the truth. (this paragraph is weak - shd point to Scripture as auth. interpretation as well as account).

Chapter Two: The revelation of God's kingship: pp.30-81

'Yhwh reigns' pp.30-49
The mediators pp.49-66
'King over the whole earth' pp.66-73
The individual pp.73-81

'Yhwh reigns' pp.30-49

- 30.1 We've got to talk about authority
- 30.2 "Authority is 'the objective correlate of freedom'. It is not force, power or persuasion. "authority in society is *one* form in which the intelligible ends or grounds of action, the created goods to which our action is oriented, lay claim upon us." (30)
- 31.1 And yet, unlike painting a picture (e.g. - which is itself our good), the "authority which lays claim on us in society" may take the form of a limitation / a constraint precisely preventing us from seeking other goods. How then can political authority be a laying claim on us to the good when it prevents us seeking goods ?
- 31.2 Humanist answer - contractarianism. "the authority of political institutions is precisely the authority of our own wills over ourselves." - our wills then (when we made the compact) as against now - when we want something else. But then it becomes relative - what's different about my will *then* from my will *now* ? Both authority (my will then) and rebellion (my will now) are lacking in objectivity of a 'good'.
- 31.3 Theistic answer - "the alien character of political authority" (31.1) is because this is God's will (though through humans) set against our wills. Failure of this answer (says O'D) is "the failure of an underdetermined theism on every front: how to present the otherness of God as propitious to mankind." (but this is the old protest against voluntarist views of a nasty God - doesn't work cos God's attributes are one).
- 32.1 When Jews said "Yhwh is king" they weren't talking about absolute power but about a good God with good purposes. But was God. "Hence the alien-familiar character of God's command: the purpose it expressed was not their purpose, but it was a purpose that corresponded to the *telos* of their own beings." (32) [DF - but c'mon, this is just a refinement of the theistic answer above. This is like people objecting to 'divine command']
- 32.2 3 kinds of association with Yhwh reigns/is king:
 - geophysical - world is stable
 - international - God rules the nation enemies of Israel
 - national - king over Israel so justice, law, protection of oppressed must follow
 Second two are related - "as Israel is situated among the nations, so are the poor and defenceless situated within Israel." (33)
- 33.1-3 Psalms 93, 97, 99, 96 considered - aspects above explored.
- 34.1-2 Other kingship passages and themes. God and the nations, international hope, rel to Israel's politics etc.
- 35.1 Surprisingly, with all this kingship stuff, remarkably rarely is it directly related to Israel's king. "There is certainly no great haste to use the language of God's kingship to 'legitimate' him." (35)

- 35.2 Buber reckoned kingship of God was anti-monarchical. Neah.
But at the same time, it's not a metaphor which derives from human monarchy either.
- 35.3 Well, that being the case, does the Yhwh kingship stuff help us politically or is it just a religious theme ?
It helps - see e.g. Is 33.22 "Yhwh is our judge. Yhwh is our lawgiver. Yhwh is our king. He it is that will save us." And "A poetry that depends especially on parallelism develops regular patterns of association, which offer a way to explore the connexions of ideas. 'Kingship' leads quite naturally to 'judgment', 'lawgiving' and 'salvation'." (35)
- 36.1 In particular, 4 main elements in God being king or Yhwh reigning:
 1. salvation - accomplishment of victorious deliverance
 2. judgment - presence of judicial discrimination
 3. possession - continuity of a community-possession
 4. praise - acknowledgement of Yhwh's reign.
 "... this exegetical framework is to play an organising role in our exposition of political theology" (36)
- 36.2 1. Salvation. God's saving initiative - more than military.
- 36.3 But military too.
- 37.1 Salvation a sign of God's hesed and tsedeq. Personal goodwill and vindicating justice. (By late Isaiah, salvation inevitably includes "public rehabilitation of a disgraced and humiliated people." (37))
- 37.2 2. Judgement. God's judgement - various texts mentioned. Is personal, salvific.
- 38.1 But also objective, righteous - God can have a controversy with his people. And "Out of this delicately balanced tension springs the whole dynamic of Israel's election-consciousness - one could say, without exaggeration, the dynamic of the Gospel itself, which, through God's act in the death and resurrection of Jesus, addresses not only our need for comfort but our need for objective justice, that paradoxically twofold need which refuses, existentially or ontologically, to be reduced to simplicity one way or the other." (38)
- 38.2 The essence of judgement: "to make a distinction between the just and the unjust, or, more precisely, to bring the distinction which already exists between them into the daylight of public observation." (38)
"Yhwh exercises his judgement by making the just and the unjust causes manifestly distinct, ending the irresolution of public ambiguity which the cunning of the evil-doer has cast around his deeds." (38-9)
- 39.1 "It is impossible to overestimate the importance of this concept for a study of biblical political ideas." (39). Not the same thing as classical / Aristotelian idea of justice as "appropriateness and proportionate equality". God's justice/judgement is a personal performance, an activity, an event not a "state of affairs".
- 39.2 But though event, activity, it is not ephemeral. It is an event, activity of God. It is part of history and relates to history as such. "If history, for Israel, is the telling of Yhwh's acts to future generations, then law is the telling of his judgments, which, once given, are to be handed on." (39) Law by precedent.
- 40.1 And the words eduth - testimony - recital, rehearsal; and hoq/huqqah - decree, engraving - bring this home, interestingly. See e.g Ps 81.4-5, Josh 8.22 etc
- 40.2 "The permanence of the law, then, was not a reflection of Yhwh's eternal unchangingness as such, but of his divine decisiveness." (40) legal and cosmic stability rest on self-consistency of Israel's God.
- 41.1 3. Possession. Community continuity and possession was by law and land. Other way round:
"Possessing the land was a matter of observing that order of life which was established by Yhwh's judgments; possessing the law was a matter of enjoying that purchase on the conditions of life which was Yhwh's gift." (41)
- 41.2 Relation to the land:
"We may say that the land was the material cause of Yhwh's kingly rule, as judgment was the formal cause and his victories the efficient cause." (41) !!!

Was a matter of

- a) inheritance/possession - Israel as whole possesses land as a whole and
- b) share/portion - each tribe and family has its allocation.

- 41.3 a) emph on common act of conquest, single centre etc
- 42.1 battles as the giving of self in relation to the land - "conquest as an act of religious self-bestowal" (42)
- 42.2 ambiguities re Gilead and over the business of the one centre
- 43.1 City Zion as single focus centre
- 43.2 Zion confidence and complacency
- 43.3 b) tribal and family landholdings - the importance of holding land as a member of Israel
- 44.1 Some 'land' passages discussed with reference to holdings - Ruth, jubilee, inalienability
- 44.2 Levites didn't hold land - Yhwh was their portion/possession. "They represented the inner truth of Israel's possession of its land, that it was a mediation of their relation with Yhwh." (45) But once lost land in 587 then every Israelite a landless, God-is-my-portion 'levite' - Lam 3.24, Ps 23, Ps 119.57
- 45.1 The threefold analysis of what 'Yhwh rules' means - victory, judgment, possession: "each of these affirmations can be tilted towards either of the others: the notions of victory and judgment come together in the idea of Yhwh's 'vindication'; the notions of judgment and possession meet in the conception of Yhwh's law; and the notions of possession and victory are associated in the role played by Mount Zion as the focus of Israel's security." (45)
- So "The threefold analysis of divine rule as salvation, judgment and possession will provide a framework for exploring the major questions about authority posed by the Western tradition. The unique covenant of Yhwh and Israel can be seen as a point of disclosure from which the nature of all political authority comes into view." (45)
- 46.1 Two theorems:
1. *"Political authority arises where power, the execution of right and the perpetuation of tradition are assured together in one coordinated agency."* "When one of the three is separated from the others, there can be no authority. The 'mystery', as we have presumed to call it, by which we freely defer to the command of social organs (even at the cost of pursuing accessible and worthy ends of action) can be realised only under conditions in which these three concerns of society are held together" (46)
- But need actually to gain, maintain and retain authority so
2. *"That any regime should actually come to hold authority, and should continue to hold it, is a work of divine providence in history, not a mere accomplishment of the human task of political service."* (46) "Behind every historically successful regime, there is the divine regime of history." (46)
- [DF this couple of theorems raise a) is no. 1 a denial of the legitimacy of unjust govts - what then our relation to it? May we actually live in a situation where there are no "powers that be"? b) is no. 2 a privileging of power over right and tradition?]
- 46.1 4. Acknowledgment. Political authority is built into reality of human existence. Third theorem:
3. *"In acknowledging political authority, society proves its political identity"* (47) "not in the constitutive sense of conferring existence on them by recognition, but in the much more basic sense of simply acknowledging that they are *there* and that they are *theirs*." (47)
- 47.1 And this was going on with acknowledgment of God as king in praises of Israel - which, too, were political. "The community is a political community by virtue of being a worshipping community ..." (47)
- 47.2 And this flows outwards to universal acknowledgment of God as king.
- 48.1 "Praise is a kind of proving or demonstration of the fact of God's kingly rule." (48) So this is different from the other three points - God is king with or without acknowledgment. "Yet the people's praise is more than 'confirmation' the kingly rule of Yhwh *takes effect in* the praises of his people so that to complete the classical analysis ... praise is the final cause of God's kingdom ... this is what God's reign is directed towards." (48)

- 49.1 "Shall we conclude, then, that within every political society there occurs, implicitly, an act of worship of divine rule? I think we may even venture as far as that. 'State-authority', remarks Stephen Clark, 'is what emerges when households, clans and crafts first recognise a sacred centre in their lives together and then forget where the centre gets its authority ... The voice of the High God reminds us that the land is his' (*Civil Peace and Sacred Order*, p.90). Certainly it explains, as very few attempts at theorising the foundations of politics ever do explain, the persistent cultural connexion between politics and religion. And it allows us to understand why it is precisely at this point that political loyalties can go so badly wrong; for a worship of divine rule which has failed to recollect or understand the divine purpose can only be an idolatrous worship which sanctions an idolatrous politics. It sheds light, too, on the nature of the impasse into which a politics constructed on an avowedly anti-sacred basis has now come. For without the act of worship political authority is unbelievable, so that binding political loyalties and obligations seem to be deprived of any point. The doctrine that *we* set up political authority, as a device to secure our own essentially private, local and unpolitical purposes, has left the Western democracies in a state of pervasive moral debilitation, which, from time to time, inevitably throws up idolatrous and authoritarian reactions."

The mediators pp.49-66

- 49.2 God's immediacy and the need for / use of mediation in his kingly relationship with Israel
- 49.3 Resistance to the need for mediation – Numbers 16 e.g. "egalitarian philosophy" (50) in guise of spiritual claims re rel with God.
- 50.1 How do immediacy and mediation relate post-Sinai. Exodus 33-4 very helpful here. Summary – "Yhwh is immediately present in conquest; his presence is mediated in judgment; and his is present in a kind of concealed immediacy in the law." (50)
- 50.2/
51.1-2 Exodus 33-34 expounded. "face to face" (33.7-11) see back not face; but Moses face shines. "It is through Yhwh's unique relation to the mediator that his own 'presence' or 'face' is secured for the community as a whole." (51)
- conquest will be in Yhwh's own hands
- judgment will be mediated in covenant
- lawgiving through Moses with shining but veiled face is indirect immediacy !
- 52.1 Moses leads in all three ways: gives victories; exercises judgment; gives pattern of life in the land (through law). The "unitary mediation of Yhwh's rule by Moses" (52)
- 52.2 Will successors combine all three? Or is there to be a separation of powers?
- 52.3 Biblical strands about monarchy – ambivalence
- 53.1 In whole story-cycles same ambivalence.
- 53.2 So how did imageless Israel become reconciled to the institution?
- 53.3 1. Military function – reservations about this as role of monarchy. How can a king be military leader when it is so obviously and immediately God's job?
- 54.1 Can see that war is God's job by its sacral/cultic treatment in e.g. Dt 20
- 54.2 More examples of God as the military leader.
- 55.1 Is the warrior-hero (David, Samson etc) model an alternative? No
- 56.1 There is development of the idea but God is still the military victor/leader.
- 56.2 Samuel, Saul, Samson
- 56.3 2. Judgment function. This element crucial in the arg for a monarchy. "Effective judgment, then, was to be the ordinary content of the monarch's exertions." (56) Rendering just judgment.
- 57.1 The judges.

- 57.2 Question of the organisation chart of the judicial function. Various people involved – Moses, appointees, Spirit-judges, Levites, priests ? Mediation and immediacy in the judicial function in Moses' time.
- 58.1 Personnel of the judicial function.
- 59.1 Local judging – at the gate.
- 59.2 Ex 32 and the Levites' judicial function
- 59.3 Num 25 and the Levites' judicial function
- 60.1 The priestly judicial function
- 60.2 II Chron 19 reorganisation . “In this way the king, by asserting his jurisdiction over all others, establishes his role as the unique mediator of Yhwh's judgments.” (61)
- 61.1 3. Function of continuity. This a vital part of monarchy. Esp in rel to law – not give it, change it, substitute for it but enforcing it.
- 61.2 General consensus that monarchy had legitimate mediation.
- 62.1 Deut-c historian more suspicious of monarchy's role in relation to law – can't underpin that – can only obey or disobey it.
- 62.2 Prophets in relation to kings – they fulfil part of what under Moses was unitary authority.
- 62.3 Prophets and priests relations in regard to the law.
- 63.1 A silly bit about Ezekiel. Still re “rival claims of priest and prophet to represent the continuing authority of Moses in the law.” (63)
- 63.2 But neither fully.
- 64.1 Relations between prophets and kings. “uncompromising insistence on the independence of the prophetic voice.” (64)
- 64.2 Developments in relationship in 9th and 8th centuries.
- 65.1 This relationship “constitutes a rejection of absolutism” (65). “But instead of rejecting the absolutist temptation by distributing powers, it permitted a unitary government subject to the independent authority of Yhwh's law, which had its independent voice in society through the prophetic movement.” (65)
- Theorem 4: *“The authority of a human regime mediates divine authority in a unitary structure, but is subject to the authority of law within the community, which bears independent witness to the divine command.”* (65) Sometimes seen as Natural Law trad-n. It's just there as a witness – it's a reality, no matter what the absolutist does.
- 65.2 But can this be extended internationally ?

‘King over the whole earth’ pp.66-73

- 66.1 God rules over the nations for Israel
- 66.2 But he rules them directly too
- 66.3 Israel and the nations – under God's direction and control
- 67.1 “Thus Israel's awareness of its own distinctness as Yhwh's chosen is held in a careful equilibrium with a hope for co-operation with surrounding peoples.” (67) Israel's rel to God – unique but not exclusive.
- 67.2 and Israel's cry “judge the nations !” itself shows and admits that she is under the same judgments – Amos on “day of the LORD” for example

- 68.1 relations with empires
- 68.2 prophetic engagement with “the nations” arises as a result of the rise of empires – some e.g.s
- 69.1 “the rise of the empires was viewed primarily as a sign of Yhwh’s judgment against his people” (69)
- 69.2 but also underlines God’s universal sovereignty and the longer range and broader vision of the prophetic hope.
- 70.1 Jer 30-33 is authentic
- 70.2 Developing critique of empire – its antecedents (Gen 11, e.g.) and aspects – military and cultural threats both.
- 70.3 (Rome is Babylon in Revelation). History is the story of God dealing with empires – Dan 2, e.g.
- 71.1 The future is the defeat, humbling, conversion of empires – leading to “an internally plural order, free from the unifying constraints of empire.” (71)
- 71.2 prophecies about future international order
- 71.3 with each nation under God’s law. Daniel, Esther, Ps 138 etc. (Vashti is a kingdom under empire – at beck and call etc; Esther is a kingdom under God – free, loyal, taking initiatives)
- 72.1 summary: “the rule of Yhwh was conceived internationally; it secured the relations of the nations and directed them towards peace. But at an international level there was to be no unitary mediator.” (72) “Yhwh’s world order was plurally constituted. World empire was a bestial deformation.” (72) And there was a law which bound the nations universally – not natural law but the law which Israel made known.
- Theorem 5: “*the appropriate unifying element in international order is law rather than government.*” (72)
- 72.2 Which means that God’s way with Israel is not same as God’s way with whole humanity. Two observations
1. “if Israel’s experience of government is to be taken as a model for other societies, then we must allow that divine providence is ready to protect other national traditions besides the sacred one.” (73) (diff forms of govt)
 2. “particular national traditions are apparently susceptible of a kind of protection which the tradition of human society as a whole is not.” (73)
- Internationally, when speaking of “humanity” then we can speak of law but not of government. “Humanity” is a real thing but “it is not a reality that we can command politically. We do not meet it in any community, however great, of which we could assume the leadership. We meet it only in the face of Christ, who presents himself as our leader and commander. The titanic temptation which besets collectives needs the check of a perpetual plurality at the universal level. There are always ‘others’, those not of our fold whom we must respect and encounter.” (73)

[DF – the arg-t for this looks a bit strained to me ... conjured rather than constructed]

The individual pp.73-81

- 73.1 there was a developing sense of the individual through Scripture history.
- 74.1 judicial appeal (to God or man) is individual
- 74.2 the sufferer is a differentiated individual
- 74.3 Job combines these two – the individual as plaintiff
- 75.1 more on Job
- 75.2 “The mediators of Yhwh’s rule do no monopolise the knowledge of Yhwh’s *mishpat* but must concede the relevance of individual insight in discerning it.” 75

- 75.3 Individual as wise counsellor in the wisdom tradition. Joseph, Daniel – king’s counsellors.
- 76.1 Prophet as combining these other two individual roles – sufferer and king’s counsellor.
- 76.2-3 Jeremiah as example
- 77.1 his mediatorial aloneness (DF’s phrase)
- 77.2 see this in suffering servant too
- 77.3 this mediation was king’s role – and now the prophet has it. Means can be an opposition between prophet’s authority and the authority of the institution
- 78.1 Jeremiah and his circle
- 78.2 Baruch
- 79.1 Jeremiah, Habakkuk and Ezekiel on individual moral responsibility
- 79.2 this emphasis on the individual is not to undermine the community but it does redefine the community more voluntaristically – I am a member of this community as one who ‘agrees’ with it.
- [DF crit – OD’s treatment of Scripture is a) overly critical and b) he expounds the critical (his)story rather than the text.]
- 80.1 Relation between the individual and the community. Don’t write ‘Whig’ history which makes developing sense of the individual what it’s all about. Because the individual springs from the community. And when under community collapse the individual stands against society it is not as individual but as voice of what the community used to be and should be.
- 80.2 Theorem 6: *“the conscience of the individual members of a community is a repository of the moral understanding which shaped it, and may serve to perpetuate it in a crisis of collapsing morale or institution.”* (80) *“The conscientious individual speaks with society’s own forgotten voice.”* (80)
- 80.3 Summary: *“We have spoken of divine rule finding complementary expression in the rule of government and in the consciousness of law: on the one hand, claims of power, right and tradition are held together in a given community by a single agency, which functioning as an effective organ of public judgment, elicits popular acknowledgment as a mediator of divine government; on the other, the community at large, and those of its members who are morally attuned to it, have a knowledge of what God requires and authorises, not only in that political community but in all communities.”* (81). So avoids both state-sovereignty and popular sovereignty because asserts divine sovereignty.
- 81.1 But must tell the story of this. Otherwise “can only advance a theological type of political theory, not an evangelical political theology, a ‘Law’, in the theological sense, rather than a ‘Gospel.’” (81). “We have, as it were, examined the design of the vehicle; now we must see it move.” (81)

Chapter Three: Dual authority and the fulfilling of the time pp.82-119

Dual authority pp.82-88

The fulfilling of the time pp.88-119

Dual authority pp.82-88 (Israel post-exile)

- 82.1 the terms ‘political’ and ‘spiritual’ take us to the very substance of the proclamation of the Kingdom of God, which spans the two. We have to let ourselves be instructed, even surprised, by what each of them contains: to rediscover politics not as a self-enclosed field of human endeavour but as the theatre of the divine self-disclosure; to rediscover God as the one who exercises rule.” (82)
- 82.2 But these are distinguishable.
- 83.1 Jer 29 described – seek the welfare of the city

- 83.2 Aug took this as speaking of two political realities co-existent in one time and space. Two ways of identifying the duality:
 - two social entities – Israel and Babylon
 - two ‘rules’ under which Israel finds herself – God’s and Babylon’s
- 83.3 the significance of the Babylonian experience for Israel. Chat about Pss of Ascent here
- 84.1 Deut-Isaiah and others seeing God’s rule in protecting and rescuing from powers so that Israel can withdraw/separate. Powers there to give Israel freedom to not care about politics. Almost.
- 85.1 Zechariah like this too. “The ideas of separation, on the one hand, and international inclusiveness on the other ... are now separated out into a ‘now’ and a ‘hereafter’.” (85)
- 85.2 The ‘hereafter’ hope does include a restored monarchy.
- 85.3 Survey of ‘restored monarchy’ hopes
- 86.1 The ‘not-yetness’ of the post-exile community – saw selves as in a time of preparation. So, e.g. Neh, Ez – a community “preoccupied by its own unreadiness for Yhwh’s reconciling act” (86)
- 86.2 Yhwh’s rule over nations not just give Israel space but give Israel opportunity for influence – Mordecai and Esther, Nehemiah etc
- 87.1 more e.g.s of both separation and influence – see, e.g. Daniel
- 87.2 But this twin conception of rel to empire is unstable because empire is unstable. Daniel 2 dream: “Empire cannot articulate to itself its suppressed knowledge of its own fragility; the king as dreamer knows something that the king as ruler cannot repeat. Yet at the same time empire cannot abide anyone having secrets, but must drag everything into the light by threat and cruelty so that it may be controlled. Thus it works its own undoing, eliciting the suppressed knowledge that will subvert its own fraudulent pretensions.” (88)
- 88.1 Instability means expectation

The fulfilling of the time pp.88-119 (Jesus)

- 88.2 Jesus’s power confirms his word – “What Jesus had to say about the reign of God was authoritative because it was confirmed by an exercise of power that demonstrated it.” (89)
- 89.1 Epistemic and political authority – the power to give instruction and the power to give commands – are one in God and in the kingdom-declaring Jesus because in the authority of God truth and power are one. God’s rule is the content of Jesus’s teaching – and in that rule word and act are one.
- 89.2 Jesus’s teaching ministry, then, ... is a disclosure of the reign of God, through which the authority of God asserts itself.” (89). Centurion – rep of authority of empire – recognises Jesus’s authority.
- 90.1 “to be *in* authority, you have to be *under* it, and if you are under it, you are in it. To be subject to authority is to be *authorised*. In that Jesus exercises the power of God’s Kingdom, he shows himself subject to that kingdom.” (90)
- 90.2 ‘Q’
- 90.3 ‘Son of Man’ – empire to be replaced by rule of the saints, redeemed Israel. ... “implied challenging the Two Kingdoms settlement with the promised unity of God’s all-sovereign rule.”
- 91.1 JB – between two ages.
- 91.2 Tax to Caesar ? what not mean
- 91.3 Interp of it – must mean a brushing aside of imperial power-claim while not actually denying it.
- 92.1 “The census-tax story, then, allows us to rule out the view that Jesus assigned Roman government a certain uncontested sphere of secular right.” (92) “Give back” – let him have it – this is not the stuff of which true government is made – my whole allegiance is to God’s rule.

- 92.2 didrachm tax – “son of the Kingdom and so emancipated from the order in which God’s rule was mediated through such alienating institutions as taxationpurely peripheral character of this compliance” (92)
- 92.3 Jesus ... believed that a shift in the locus of power was taking place, which made the social institutions that had prevailed to that point anachronistic. His attitude to them was neither secularist nor zealot: since he did not concede that they had any future, he gave them neither dutiful obedience within their supposed sphere of competence nor the inverted respect of angry defiance. He did not recognise a permanently twofold locus of authority. He recognised only a transitory duality which belonged to the climax of Israel’s history, a duality between the coming and the passing order. So the duality inherited from Israel’s past underwent a transformation. The Two Cities, with their concomitant Two Rules expressing Israel’s alienation from its calling, gave way to the Two Eras. The coming era of God’s rule held the passing era in suspension.” (93)
- 93.1 Though temple tax was *political*
- 93.2 The threefold analysis in Jesus
- 93.3 1. Jesus’s works of power. What enemies – spiritual powers. (Colonial status just a symptom)
- 94.1 sometimes the recognition of deeper problems is used to de-politicise.
- 94.2 Jesus represents unified rule of God. “the establishment of multiple centres of competing power is a recipe for political weakness.” (94)
- 95.1 Jesus exercises power against a-political (spiritual) forces in order to make space for true politics. “Jesus’ departure from the zealot programme showed his more theological understanding of power, not his disinterest in it. The empowerment of Israel was more important than the disempowerment of Rome.” (95) “The gift of power was not a zero-sum operation. God could generate new power by doing new things in Israel’s midst.” (95)
- 95.2 Jesus not a zealot revolutionary
- 95.3 but it is relevant background
- 95.4 reserve in the gospels about false publicity of Jesus’s power
- 96.1 this reserve in Mark’s secret.
- 96.2 2. Jesus proclaimed judgment of Israel. Fall of Jer-m stuff. Gentile / Israel reversal stuff.
- 97.1 aspects of judgment on Israel
- 97.2 +ve view of ‘crowds’
- 98.1 and the ‘poor’ – dependence on God and openness to his kingdom
- 98.2 tax-collectors – judgment as recovering and reconciling the alienated.
- 99.1 gentiles the most alienated of all
- 99.2 authenticity of Syrophenician woman and Roman centurion stories
- 99.3 John 12 Greeks
- 100.1 3. Jesus and Israel’s possession of the law. Israel’s pride in the law
- 100.2 Jesus as a teacher of the law – “he, too, was an interpreter of God’s law, who believed that national restoration had to come through the reappropriation of the law.” (100)
- 101.1 does so authoritatively and finally
- 101.2 Sanders on Jesus and pharisaism

- 101.3 'hypocrites'
- 101.4 criticism of the Pharisees was authentic to Jesus
- 102.1 main criticism – their 'outside-in' holiness
- 102.2 examples
- 102.3 Sabbath – 6 stories – 2 approaches
- 103.1 Approach 1: "Jesus argues that deeds of mercy may be performed on the sabbath, and appeals to accepted practice to provide analogies" i.e. mercy takes precedence
- 103.2 Approach 2 – eschatological argument – "the time had come for the royal prerogatives of David to be reasserted." (103) Fulfillment – human maturity: "In fulfillment of the prophecy of Daniel 2 ('obviously pregnant with the meaning of Genesis 2' (q Wright – NTPG, p.292)) God has conferred his authority upon *mankind*, represented in the triumphant Israel. In the exercise of this authority mankind is now free to interpret God's law in a way that realises God's purposes for mankind's welfare. The legal tradition which had prepared God's people for this moment could transform itself to accommodate its own fulfillment." (104)
- 104.1 John 5
- 104.2 Jesus forms a new Israel - a 'decisive' Israel
- 104.3 the 'disciples'
- 105.1 the 12 – "they focus representatively the life of the restored Israel living under the authorisation of the coming Kingdom" (105) 70 // Numbers 11
- 105.2 authority of the 12 the threefold form: – cast demons – victory; preach – carried k-m judgment; continuity of Israel's identity.
- 106.1 nature of this authority revised – is service and humility – "the notion of authority has not been abolished, but it has been refashioned on the model of how God exercises his own." (106)
- 106.2 So, Jesus and law – what say ? Look at Matt 5-7 / Luke 6
- 107.1 Lord's Prayer
- 107.2 Generosity or hypocrisy the two options in SM
- 108.1 beatitudes – "do not speak of 'life in the Kingdom' ... but of the essential contradictions of that life which is seriously preparing for the Kingdom" (108)
- 108.2 What of 5.17-21 ?
- 108.3 fulfill = ? - "satisfaction of expectation"
- 109.1 Jesus on the interior demands of the law
- 109.2 the essence of the demand – perfection = performance. Do it, don't just talk about it.
- 109.3 so opposite of hypocrite is not just a matter of pure motive
- 110.1 'hidden' to Jesus mean
 - 1) ultimate disposition of the self – the heart. "It is an attribute of the agent, not of particular acts; but it is known, over time, through the agent's acts." (110)
 - 2) private acts not open to public enquiry and judgment
- 110.2 hidden, therefore, means 'beyond public'. This is key to the antitheses in SM
- 111.1 oaths

- 111.2 love enemies – cos about to be decisively beaten/converted – so can afford to love them ? “To extend the scope of love to embrace the enemy was to demonstrate hope: the end of enmity was now at hand.” (111)
- 111.3 retaliation – “early Christian distrust of litigation ... reserve about the institutions of public justice” (111-112) Fulfilling of law means the end of all our thirst for public vindication. Don’t seek judgment – it’s coming.
- 112.1 Jesus denies that he is a ‘divider’ or settler of cases
- 112.2 “Yet the reserve about courts is not a reserve about the law as such” (112) Judgment not abolished but is now in light of God’s judgment – 7.1. This is new cov-t community – law written on hearts, and judging accordingly. The eschat comm-y
- 113.1 4. Praise / acknowledgement. Equivalent is faith in Jesus.
- 113.2 JB more about repentance than faith. Though this is included in the priority of faith which Jesus establishes.
- 114.1 Two elements in the faith in Jesus which Jesus required: confidence in his power and recognition of his identity.
- 114.2 the latter develops in the gospel story.
- 115.1 and this identity is a political one
- 115.2 Mark 12.37ff
- 116.1 John 6.15 ff
- 116.2 the sort of Messiah – successor to David – was ambiguous and Jesus “would neither endorse nor reject everything that could be inferred from it.” (116)
- 116.3 Son of Man title gives priority to Kingdom ideas – cos of Daniel link. “The Son of Man sayings function like compressed arguments, in which the premise is the given fact of the coming Kingdom of God and the conclusion about Jesus’s own authority, or fate, is inferred from his representative role.” (117)
- 117.1 Some Davidic expectations allowed by Jesus – entry into Jerusalem. Unified rule re-established by him – separation of powers over. “Jesus placed himself at the centre of socio-political and religious authority in Israel ... the reauthorising of Israel rather than the deauthorising of Rome” 117 “The appearance of true authority in Israel meant the unity of political and religious spheres under the rule of God. Obedience and worship were to be one and the same”. But that is to say: the Kingdom was the Lord’s !” (117)
- 117.2 Coming of Km and recognition of Jesus are linked.
- 117.3 Birth narratives this way. Political significance of Matthew’s
- 118.1 Luke’s – saviour, house David, Augustus and his “tyrannous desire to ‘enrol’ the people of God.” (118) Peace on earth. Good news etc
- 118.2 so Jesus redefines ‘political’ and ‘spiritual’. And we need to redefine them from Jesus: “The problem is with the assumption that we move from ‘core’ political concepts to the Kingdom of God as from the known to the unknown. Precisely the opposite movement is called for. Can we not be introduced to a kind of rule that is unlike, as well as like, the kind of rule with which we are familiar ? And can we not be taught to conceive of living with law in a manner unlike, as well as like, the litigious culture we associate with lawcourts ? The first assumption of political theology must be that these analogies are valid, and that through them the Gospel of the Kingdom offers liberation to an imprisoned political culture. Political aspirations find their true satisfaction in these unlikely likenesses.” (119)

Chapter Four: The Triumph of the Kingdom pp.120-157

The representative pp.120-133

The moments of the representative act pp.133-146

The subjection of the nations pp.146-157

The representative pp.120-133

- 120.1 Jesus is the turning point. "Jesus proclaimed the coming of the Kingdom of God, but the apostolic church did not. It told the story of what happened when the Kingdom came: its conflict with the established principalities and powers and its vindication at God's hand through Jesus's resurrection. What the church proclaimed was not what Jesus had proclaimed, because it stood on the other side of that great crisis which his proclamation evoked." (120)
- 120.2 extremes of continuity and discontinuity in OT to NT and Jesus to early church.
- 120.3 which is not the same as setting the gospels against the rest of the NT
- 121.1 problems with "Jesuology" in political theology: political theology "tends to find more of immediately political interest in the message of Jesus" (121) - pacificism of Tolstoy through to Liberation theology. But this is a "helpful illusion: let us model ourselves on Jesus, ignoring Caiaphas and Pilate; then we will at least achieve something, even if it is not what we hope to achieve." (121)
- 122.1 but doesn't including the death and res-n of Jesus (as against his 'teaching') mean that we're back to salvation of souls focus: "How can a community without local or national limits avoid evaporating into an indeterminate ideal with no concrete social presence? These are the objections which classical republicans, ancient and modern, have made to Christianity, accusing it of replacing political society with a communion of immortal souls with divine thoughts, defying political structures." (122)
Undermines political interest?
- 122.2 But turn the criticism around - what's so great about a politics which ignores the most important event of history and other dimensions of life? "By what right is the term 'political' claimed exclusively for the defence of social structures which refuse the deeper spiritual and cosmic aspirations of mankind?" (122) ... "A 'pure' political theory which can make it a matter of intellectual conscience to disinterest itself in the transcendent is not one that any humane thinker need feel guilty about rejecting." (122)
- 122.3 No, the task is to redefine politics by the gospel. "a political theology shaped by the Christ-event ... must criticise existing notions of political good and necessity ... in the light of what God has done for the human race and the human soul. Public norms must be adjusted to the new realities when ordinary members of society may hear the voice of God and speak it in public, even, according to the prophet, men and women slaves. Ideas of what government is must be corrected in the light of that imperious government which the Spirit wields through the conscience of each worshipper. This is political theology in its liberal mode, attacking and overcoming the pretentiousness of the autonomous political order. But there is also a constructive side to its task, which is to show how the extension of the Gospel of the Kingdom into the Paschal Gospel elevates, rather than destroys, our experience of community. Political theology has an ecclesiological mode, which takes the church seriously as a society and shows how the rule of God is realised there. The independence, then, of the individual believer is not antisocial. It arises from the authority of another community, centred in the authority of the risen Christ ... The life, death and triumph of Israel's representative have defined that community precisely; it exists by participation in that one focal event." (122-23)
- 123.1 So this is a Christological task.
- 123.2 Jesus combines two roles - mediator of God's rule and representative individual of the community. "We must then speak of Christ as the *decisive* presence of God [DF = mediator = God-side] and the *decisive* presence of God's people [DF = representative - human-side]." (124)
- 124.1 Bit like God-man stuff but doing this through the actual historical story.
- 124.2 Mediation: "Here the mediatorial role is elevated to transparency." - Because Jesus is God then this is divine rule with immediacy.
- 124.3 Ezekiel 34 for this - Yhwh will intervene *personally*. "Yhwh's servant David will become completely transparent to Yhwh's own direct intervention as saviour and judge" (125)

- 125.1 Representation: 2 elements - "(a) The representative *alone* constitutes the presence of the represented; (b) The represented are *really present* in what the representative does and experiences on their behalf" (125) If just (a) then is a kind of fiction - represented not really present but we pretend they are. If just (b) then "representation is diminished into paradigm; the representative does and experiences nothing more than the represented ..." (125)
- 125.2 So rep-ve has to be *atypical* - something more than was already there. This normally expressed in sinlessness of Christ. "To represent is to transcend the represented ... in the identification of the representative with the represented there is something fitting, but there is also something innovative and unforeseen." (126)
- 126.1 but the represented is not simply absent while the rep-ve stands in and also the rep-ve doesn't absent himself in order that the represented may return. "political representation, which is not replacement but co-presence" (126)
- 126.2 Christ as representative is not "temporary". Is always such. But that doesn't deprive us - "political representation is not a zero-sum operation ... to found a structure of political representation is to multiply freedom and authority, leaving everyone with more" (126-7) His ruling presence enriches, fulfills, enhances the political life / rule of those he represents. But can only get to this point if we have redefined our politics by the Gospel. Normal ways do see political power of representative and represented as zero-sum game. But we have "the eschatological transformation of politics by the Christ-event. It is not clear how we can see political authority as conferring freedom, rather than taking it away, unless we have first learned to think in terms of a rule that is salvific." (127) "Freedom is perfected in the act of representation. Christ is not first alone and then together with his brothers, first representing them and then handing back the representative function; he is at one and the same time alone and accompanied, always representing, always together with those he represents." (127)
- 127.1 "About the term 'substitute' it is enough to say that it singles out a moment within the concept of representation. It has to be understood in relation to the more inclusive term, and is misleading if used in isolation. Yet it identifies one of the two necessary poles of the representative role, the point of initiative and innovation where the representative moves in to fill the breach left empty". (127)
- 127.2 The mediatorial representation of Christ applies to all that Christ did and not just to his death.
- 128.1 Need to keep death and resurrection together. "Christ's death, therefore, takes place within the sphere of the old authority; it represents the point at which the old is confronted and challenged; in the resurrection the challenge issues in the assertion of the new." (128)
- 128.2 -
- 129.2 Talking through new and old, death and resurrection realms in Romans 6-8
- 129.3 but we can't have resurrection without death either ...
- 130.1 the pattern of prophetic representation and Jesus's earthly ministry - "double representation" in e.g. Jeremiah
- 130.2 For Israel - and so for humankind. Or just straightforwardly and directly for humankind ?
- 130.3 It's all over for Israel v prominent in the early church thinking
- 131.1 but not in Paul - Romans 11 - Israel will come to Christ. He is goal of the covenant and the "root".
- 132.1 and Israel's 'public tradition' remains a witness to all.
- 132.2 and the church aspires to it. If church is grafted onto a particular community then "The age of the church is one of striving to reclaim the public tradition of Israel for the faith which completes Israel" (132).
- 132.3 Ephesians 2 does not contradict this continuity reading. There "the problem that presents itself is the exclusion of the Gentiles from *the public tradition of Israel*. The idea of Israel's replacement by the Gentiles has not even appeared on the horizon. (132-3)
- 133.1 This happened in history so "We cannot discuss the question of 'secular' government, the question from which Western political theology has too often been content to start, unless we approach it historically,

from a Christology that has been displayed in narrative form as Gospel. Christ's road to victory, then, and the subjection of the nations are the subject of what follows." (133)

The moments of the representative act pp.133-146

133.2 The four moments: Advent; Passion; Resurrection; Exaltation

133.3 1. Advent

134.1 Details of Jesus's baptism as double representative - God's rep ruler and Israel's rep. Way in which Jesus as SG, King Israel is people's rep

134.2 Other angle is the 'incarnational' way of describing advent – emphasizes that this is God

135.1 e.g. Philippians 2 - "the double use of the word 'form' expresses the double representation performed by Christ." (135) "A self-sufficient divine sovereignty, self-justified and complete, has come to be a rule in which all human nature finds itself represented." (135)

135.2 The narrative form of Phil 2 is real – not just way of saying he's both God and man.

Incidental: [nonetheless, real, historical, actually happened narrative isn't same thing as saying there's not more to it: ...] "Any story which travels from heaven to earth and back again must have a symbolic element in it to the extent that it coordinates in one time-space field the being of God on the one hand and the earthly events which reflect his being on the other. The earthly time-space field is imaginatively extended to accommodate the ultimate source and end of what happens within it." (135)

"The coming of the Kingdom [was] an event which could, indeed, be dated." (136)

136.1 Putting things the Phil 2 way shows that actual hist-l event is rooted in eternal divine purpose

136.2 2. Passion

Judgment has two moments – 1. sep-n b/w innocence and guilt and 2. vindication of innocent
Can look then as if all happens in res-n
But actually has been happening with conflict b/w Christ and Israel on cross and before

137.1 Gospel accounts of pre-passion conflict

137.2 Jesus at climactic confrontation b/w two kingdoms as conceived by post-exilic Israel – human and divine

137.3 see this in Mark 11.27ff – what authority? Either God's or human. If God's then God has intervened and Jesus is God intervening. The authority qn amounts to "is Jesus the arrival of God's rule?"

138.1 leaders' answer is – no, Jesus is from men. At which point they themselves have no authority from men (cos are going against the people) and none from God (cos going against his authorised agent).

138.2- The theme of conflicting authorities in Luke's passion account: 22.21-30; 22.31ff; 22.35-8

139.2 "the appropriate posture for political expectancy. 'I am in your midst as a servant' (138-9)
" 'I assign to you a kingdom'. Those who have rejected the pursuit of authority in favour of service, as Jesus has, will, nevertheless, inherit authority, as Jesus will." (139)

140.1 same theme traced in John. Two short dialogues with Pilate: 18.33-40, 19.9-12 – "question of rule and authority is central" (140). Pilate is reassured when hears about truth – so long as it's not political power he's not worried.

140.2 "Pilate's incomprehension represents the unawareness of the bestial empire against which the Son of Man is to be vindicated". (140) "What is truth?" is dismissive. (= "I only care for guns/votes")

140.3 2nd dialogue

141.1 3. Restoration

“The *Restoration* of Christ from death is, in the first place, the judgment of God against Israel and for Israel: the overcoming of Israel’s sin and the affirmation of Israel’s new identity in its representative.” (141) (and Israel’s hope is humankind’s – a la NTW - not mentioned)

- 141.2 Resurrection is 1) restoration and 2) endowment with authority / power
- 142.1 Restoration and empowerment sep in Lk and John (cos sep Easter and ascen-n) but kept together in rest of NT
- 142.2 Restoration and empowerment are inseparable though distinct. To distinguish can help v 2 mistakes
- 143.1 mistake 1 – losing the discontinuity of resurr-n which restores creation – otherwise history is just an upward slope
- 143.2 mistake 2 – lose “the balance between what has been accomplished and what remains to be accomplished” (143) Ascension is “a bridge between the time of Christ’s life and the time of the world’s future” (143). Ascension’s distinct eschat-l significance (there’s more to come / be revealed).
- 144.1 4. Exaltation
Exaltation described in kingdom terms – take throne, receive kingdom etc
- 144.2 Demythologizing the ascension is de-politicizing it too. Becomes “a personal affair, not in the realm of public achievement” (145)
- 145.1 Language of coronation is symbolic of something and is therefore political
- 145.2 1) ascension is the conclusion of the story of Christ
 1. power put forth – incarnation
 2. judgment effected – passion
 3. gift of communal identity – restoration
 4. confirmation / expression of above – coronation i.e. the pattern seen above
- 145.3 2) ascension is foundation which determines all future time – his presence, his absence, his presence in absence, his unqualified presence

The subjection of the nations pp.146-157

- 146.1 “The kingly rule of Christ is God’s own rule exercised over the whole world” (146) (visible in church – see next chapter)
 1. “the authorities ... have been made subject to God’s sovereignty in the exaltation of Christ” (146)
 2. “this awaits a final universal presence of Christ to become fully apparent” (146)These two assertions set frame for account of secular authority
- 146.2 Rel of secular auth-y and the church’s mission – “If the mission of the church needs a certain social space, for men and women of every nation to be drawn into the governed community of God’s Kingdom, then secular authority is authorised to provide and ensure that space.” (146)

I Tim 2 – “the goals and conduct of secular government are to be reconceived to serve the needs of international mobility and contact which the advancement of the Gospel requires.” (147)
- 147.1 Rom 13 - “Christ’s victory ... is the same victory that was promised to Israel over the nations, the victory of a God-filled and humanised social order over bestial and God-denying empires, a victory won for Israel on behalf of all mankind. As Israel is claimed for faith, then, [DF – this is what OD is saying Rom 9ff is about] so the authorities are claimed for obedience to Israel, chastened and reduced to the familiar functions that were once assigned to Israel’s judges.” (147)
- 147.2 Nature and role of secular govt – Paul talks of “prevailing auths” not kings etc – has angelic feel to the term and therefore “by posing the qn of polit-l auth-y in these terms, Paul is placing it in the context of the victory of Christ.” (147) “Paul undertakes to show that it is by God’s purpose that the structures of the old age ‘continue to exercise their sway’ (*eis auto touto proskarterountes*, 13.6) serving the church’s mission.” (147)
- 147.3 “That purpose is judgment” (147). This now primary – “the privileging of this aspect of governmental authority, so that the whole rationale of government is seen to rest on its capacity to effect the judicial

task.” (148) Wdn’t know this from before – in Israel and in classical world, main function was the possession/protection function but “St Paul’s new assertion is that the performance of judgment alone justifies government; and this reflects his new Christian understanding of the political situation.” (148)

- 148.1 Can’t continue the identity function cos that is in Christ – “Membership in Christ replaced all other political identities by which communities knew themselves.” (148)
- 148.2 Christians are subject to and glad of the judicial function – taxes as sign of this
- 149.1 and Rom 13 is contrast to way church organises her own life – unwilling to litigate, no revenge, “pay” everything you can, not just what is due.
- 149.2 I Peter 2 – bit more of the two kingdoms mindset but rel to Rom 13 – “judgment as the sole purpose for which emperors and governors are “sent out” by God, while the Christian community continues to live in its own social space, free in relation to the authorities of the world and subservient directly to God.” (149)
- 149.3 Emph on judicial function contrasts with church unwillingness to litigate
- 150.1 and church courts, therefore, all about reconciliation
- 150.2 note that there are no punishments within the church – there are ways of trying to reconcile you and there is expulsion *from* the church. But the church has placed all in the final judgment. “The secular authorities, on the other hand, deal only in provisional and penultimate judgments ... an important witness to those to whom the word of final judgment has yet to come.” (151)
- 151.1 whole para:
“But secular authorities are no longer in the fullest sense mediators of the rule of God. They mediate his judgments only. The power that they exercise in defeating their enemies, the national possessions they safeguard, these are now rendered irrelevant by Christ’s triumph. This is what might properly be meant by that misleading expression, the ‘desacralisation’ of politics by the Gospel. No government has a right to exist, no nation has a right to defend itself. Such claims are overwhelmed by the immediate claim of the Kingdom. There remains simply the rump of political authority which cannot be dispensed with yet, the exercise of judgment.” (151)
- 151.2 Yoder generally fails to see the state as under Christ (and therefore as a limited good)
- 151.2 He’s misunderstood the tradition as too submissive / conservative / affirming
- 152.1 other problems with Yoder
- 152.2 “The theme of Romans 13 is the authority which remains to secular government in the aftermath of Christ’s triumph” (152). II Thess 2 may be related to Emperor
- 152.3 Now if state tries more than shd, it becomes blasphemous and (since the victory of Christ which reduced the state’s powers is apocalyptic/eschat) in a “moment of apocalyptic division”. (153). “Precisely those modest judicial accounts of governmental function ... forced the church to see in the accrual of divine titles and religious symbols by the empire a defiance of resurrection order.” (152)
- 153.1 Revelation explores this for us – “The task he set himself was to integrate the apocalyptic account of current political developments into a Christian view of history, in which Christ’s crucifixion was the decisive achievement of God’s purposes. His theme is that the evolution of the idolatrous imperial pretensions is a necessary outcome of the Messianic victory itself, a working out of Satan’s downfall on Calvary.” (153)
- 153.2 Xt’s death and res-n as key to history.
History in 3 ways:
 1. seals – “history as a series of worsening man-made calamities” mess made by sin but some preserved
 2. trumpets – “history as a series of judgments invoked by prayer” – retribution on mess
 3. bowls – “history as a series of divine judgments”
- 154.1 and 12-14 explains. Work of Christ. “idolatrous totalitarian political order” - a “parodic mirror-image of the Kingdom of God which has just dawned” (154) “The unqualified allegiance which the empire demands and enforces by exclusion challenges the demands of the Kingdom of Heaven itself.” (154)

- 154.2 17-19 – Roman empire. Takes up OT prophetic critique of empire.
- 155.1 Odd that lots re politics and yet in Rev there is v little of the social concreteness/dimension of the church.
- 155.2 if assume Rome as “the great city” then have the odd thing of a) Jer-m b) Rome and c) church all being described in similar ways – “Three political communities, ancient Israel, the pagan empire and the eschatological church, are being drawn together in a startling identification.” (156) “The reason why John of Patmos will not allow the church a distinct social presence is that its witnesses claim back the Great City to become the Holy City.” (156)
- 156.1 “There is but one structured human community, and there can never be a second ... The church is not apart from it; it is the sanctuary within its midst, and by its acts of witness it enables its transformation to begin.” (156)
- 156.2 So, with victory of Christ, the rel of church and secular govt cd go two ways:
 1. “government could be seen as thrust back by Christ’s victory to the margins, there to be reauthorised to perform a single function of which the church outside the world stood in need for the time being” (156)
 2. “could be seen as goaded by Christ’s victory to a last desperate assertion of itself, momentarily overwhelming the church’s solidarity in an alternative, massively smothering solidarity of refusal.” (156-7)

Chapter Five: The church pp.158-192

The authorisation of the church pp.158-174

Moments of recapitulation pp.174-192

The authorisation of the church pp.158-174

- 158.1 Jesus is point of confrontation. So, therefore, is church – and now, “the future age now has a social and political presence” (158)
- 158.2 Dual authority – in exile and post-exile experienced negatively. But now “their possession is secure, judgment given, the power of God at their disposal” and so, though still conflict, it is the church on the march and the world on the run: “the church presses back upon the old and withering authority of empire” (158)
- 159.1 So must decide first what is the nature of the authority of the church (this chap) and then what that means for rels b/w church and state (next chap)
- 159.2 Two starting propositions. 1. “the political character of the church’s social existence” 2. “the hidden and undisclosed status of the rule which constitutes it” (159)
- 159.3 1. *the political character of the church’s social existence.* this not mean it’s a nation state or a function-limited institution. “Describing the church as a political society means to say that it is brought into being and held in being, not by a special function it has to fulfil, but by a government that it obeys in everything. It is ruled and authorised by the ascended Christ alone and supremely; it therefore has its own authority; and it is not answerable to any other authority that may attempt to subsume it.” (If this is not the CROWN RIGHTS which Rutherford and others asserted, what is? !!!) (159)
- 159.4 This sense of the church’s political indep – Phil 3.20, I Peter 2.11, 13, 16. I Tim 1.9 – “a claim to be free from legislative authority, acknowledging its right but from an independent distance, rather as one might acknowledge the right of a foreign government” ! (160) This is a *distinct* society
- 160.1 Same in early church - Ep ad Diog 5 – we keep laws etc but have own citizenship. “alienation concealed under the appearance of full membership” (160) Other examples – Chrysostom – *On the statues*, 17; Ambrose – 386 “remarked disdainfully to Valentinian II that Christians, instructed by God’s law, had no need of the emperor’s, which at best could cow the fearful and could never turn the heart to faith.” (Ep. 75 (22)) Gregory Great – [OD] – “earthly authority is not exercised over *brethren* but over *sins*” (*Moralia* 26.46)

- 160.2 later gens of the church toned this down a bit: “the whole concept of political community, too unsusceptible, as the Victorians thought, of that inwardness which, for them, was the criterion of the operations of divine grace.” (160)
- 161.1 Church’s auth-y from Pentecost which “authorises the church by uniting it with the authorisation of Christ” (161) Is linked with whole saving event of Christ (in its 4 moments) – Christ reps them and by Spirit they participate. Church is the true Israel and the gathering nations – rep-d by Christ and brought by Spirit
- 161.2 rel to ascension? “Pentecost can be seen as the moment at which the church comes to participate in the authority of the ascended Christ” (162)
- 162.1 this sort of thing in John
- 162.2 another mistake – change category so church as religious practice to fit into other pol-l auths rather than a pol auth itself
- 162.3 {DF don’t get this} this is sometimes related to failing to understand rel to Israel
- 163.1 Sometimes priest-king stuff used to explain church-state. (This v v easily leads to loss of the recog that church itself is and has pol auth)
- 163.2 and then general patterns from other rels found too
- 163.3 papalists did a better job of relating these two – “the Christ-l foundation of the papal claims preserved for medieval theology a Christocentric understanding of authority in church and state which was otherwise imperilled.” (163)
- 163.4 John Overall’s 1606 *Convocation Book*: “Concerning the Government of God’s Catholick Church and the Kingdom of the Whole Worlde” (nearly became official CofE formulary). E.g. of Ref-n pol theo-y:
- 163.4 Auth-y of 2nd person over everything. Dual line of civil and eccles-l authy. “normal pattern ... princes who practised their ‘auth-y in causes eccles-l’ (I. Canon 21) and priests who were ‘rightly and properly subjects’ (I. Canon 18), but ‘both having their bounds and limits appointed unto them by God.’” (I.22) (164) Son of God “reigned through both lines, as ‘head and sole (though invisible) Monarch’” (164)
- 164.1 Not much changed with Xt’s life and work – confirms the dual auth-y pattern. Aargh – “his was a spiritual, not a temporal kingdom” (II.3) (164)
- 165.1 “In a self-betraying moment Overall affirms that Christ was ‘content’ to be ‘only’ a spiritual king to rule men’s hearts (II. Canon 8)
- 165.2 “The effect is that the church acquires no distinct identity as a society governed by the ascended Christ. It has become the eccles-l system within a community that is primarily structured otherwise as a civil kingdom.” (165) and so “the key element which made sense of the Christendom idea is missing: the eschatology which founded dual instits in the confrontation of the victorious Christ with the defeated world-rulers and protected them against a loss of tension”. (165) Civil auths as given – not having to come to terms with pol kingship of Jesus and pol auth of church.
- 165.3 Byzantine theology – also worked on the priest-king, church-state duality.
- 166.1 *2. the pol character of the church, its essential nature as a governed society, [DF underline] is hidden, to be discerned by faith.*

[prop-n 1 – 159 – the corresponding mistake is to fail to see the *pol* auth of church – and this generally manifests as Erastianism ...

prop-n 2 – 166 – the corresponding mistake is to prematurely (ahead of parousia) make this visible – and this generally manifests as papalism (effort to put visible rival auths/instits over against the visible civil ones)]

Paradox of church as political.

- a) it IS pol – “a community of obedience and freedom, a society under the law of Christ, heedful of his commands and direction and enjoying the freedom from all other lordships that he has won for it”
- b) it doesn’t LOOK pol from the outside – no visible source of govt, people tend to obey the civil laws etc

- 166.2 so temptation to make the pol-l nature/auth-y of church visible. “Charged to realise the premonarchical confidence of Israel that it had no king but Yhwh, the church compromises itself when it asserts from its midst a ruling entity to act on Christ’s behalf, matching the claims of secular rulers with counter-claims.” (166)
- 166.3 example 1 of this – Gregory the Great’s handbook for clergy calls them rulers and instructs them as such. Oh dear
- 167.1 example 2 – the papacy as described by Gelasius (*Ep ad Anastasium*). Priest-king duality. Church and state as “respective spheres of responsibility” (sacraments to church, public order to state).
- 167.2 example 3 / devt of this – in reforms of Greg VII which set up a “juridical element” for the church with “creation of a new corpus of law to govern the church as a juridical society” (167) claiming clergy as particular subjects – legally a people apart with own fiscal and juridical existence. AND claimed auth over sec rulers. Oh dear, oh dear.
- 168.1 Questioning voices – e.g. Bernard who says that in principle pope shd have no sec auth and if is necessary then at least should “preside rather than rule” (168). Ruling about possession cf presiding about caring and providing
- 168.2 Nature of mistake above – not order of ministry as such; nor that church and state auths may be rivals. No, “The mistake is quite simply to posit an order of ministry, of whatever sort, and to deduce the identity of the church from it, as though *that* were the rule of Christ.” (168)
- 168.3 If go Ignatius and Cyprian then danger is that you’ll think that the existence of certain officers (est over against and in conscious opp-n to civil rulers, as it happens) itself shapes, defines the church. NO. It’s not that Christ rules and then locates that rule (definition/delimitation of the church) in certain offices. You are not in the pol auth of the church only in rel to certain offices. The offices are last, not first links in ecclesiological chain.
- 169.1 contrast other pol communities where the “offices” – form and person of government, emphatically are determinative of the community. “The identity of the church is given wholly and completely in the relation of its members to the ascended Christ independently of church ministry and organisation. Of no political community can it be said that it retains its identity irrespective of how, or by whom, it is governed.” (169)
- [DF – but this is v v dangerous – chasm of vis / invis split is opening up again]
- 169.2 3. (follows from previous 2 props): “How, then, may we describe the church’s political character as a community ruled by Christ?” (169)
First, distinguish b/w catholicity [DF not sure what means here by this – Spirit-authenticity, spiritual reality, eschatological undeniableness?] and order. That there are loose ends not mean it’s not a pol auth/comm-y
- 170.1 Threefold analysis of church: (i) the church invisible (ii) the church catholic and visible (iii) the church particular and organised. Found in Lutherans 1538, Calvin *Inst* IV.I.7-9, not in Ang articles, and then “in lapidary statement of the Westminster Confession of 1647, we find it perfectly expressed:
- The Catholick or Universal Church which is invisible, consists of the whole number of the elect, that have bin, are, or shall be gathered into one ... The visible Church, which is also Catholick or Universal under the Gospell (not confined to one Nation as before under the law), consists of all those throughout the World that profess the true Religion; and of their children: and is the Kingdome of the Lord Jesus Christ ... This Catholick Church hath bin sometimes more, sometimes less visible. And particular Churches, which are Members thereof, are more or less pure, according as the Doctrine of the Gospel is taught and imbraced ...
- 171.1 But is this “catholic” church (considered apart from order and particularity) a formless thing? What structure does it have if considered apart from structure? It does have structure – the structure of the Christ-event which brings it into existence and in which it participates.
- 171.2 I Tim 3.14-16 shows that organising the church is determined by the structure of the Christ-event
- 171.3 But this not mean that order doesn’t matter (Geneva reminds us it does). There are structures, marks, badges, institutions which are proper to the church. “Catholicity and order are related as substance and form” (172)

- 172.1 What are these? Since Christ-shaped, must be sacraments rather than ministry: “it is not the order of the church’s *ministry* which announces with formal clarity the fact that this is Christ’s community; it is the church’s *sacramental* order which does so.” (172) The sacraments give institutional form and order. They make the church visible. “In these forms we know where the church is and can attach ourselves to it.” (172)
- 172.2 Rel between 4 acts of Christ-event and the sacraments as order? 1. Church is formed by fourth event – exaltation (standing for all 4). 2. Church’s response to all 4 is her 4th – speech. 3. Sacraments embody this: “There arises a series of formed acts and observances, through which in acted speech (performance shaped by the interpreting word, word embodied in performance) it recapitulates the saving acts of Christ once more. These are the church’s sacraments.” (173)
- 173.1 “Sacrament” is one (encounter Christ) and many (lots ways). Take 4 as heuristic and relate to the 4 events:
1. Baptism goes with advent 2. Eucharist goes with Passion 3. “the keeping of the Lord’s Day” goes with resurrection (and is, “solemn observance”) and 4. laying on of hands goes with Pentecost
- 173.2 At this point are ready to start talking about details of order of ministry. Not going to – even though matters a lot – because main reason for talking about this is dealt with – to show that whereas secular govt determined by the secular rulers (persons and offices), this is not so in church. Christ alone is ruler-king in the church and its political community reality is shaped, therefore, not by persons/offices made to parallel secular rulers.
- 174.1 Won’t try to do the ministerial order thing but need to sort out rel b/w office and charism; and to interpret/deal with the historical manifestations. What if we ended up with
- church gathers – ministry of recognising Christians – primatial bishop
- church suffers – ministry of suffering service – deacon
- church recovers creation order – ministry of instruction – presbyter-bishop
- church as prophet – ministry of diverse admin to build up – lay charism ?

Moments of recapitulation pp.174-192

- 174.2 The Christ-event structures the church – “is the structuring principle for all ecclesiology, holding the key both to the church’s spontaneous ‘catholic’ existence and to its formal structure” 175
1. Advent – gathering community – baptism
 2. Passion – suffering community – eucharist
 3. Resurrection – glad community – keeping the Lord’s Day
 4. Exaltation – community that speaks the words of God – laying on of hands
- Each brings its own form of authorisation/authority
- 175.1 1. “In response to the Advent of Christ, the church is a *gathering community*. It continually adds to its membership from all existing political and natural communities It can exist only as a community that is always gathering, anticipating the final state in which mankind as totality will gladly be subject to the rule of God.” (175) CD 6.12
- “the church leaps over all existing communal boundaries and forbids any part of the human race – even the church itself, as *presently* gathered and structured – to think of the Kingdom of God as confined within its own limits and to lose interest in what lies beyond them.” (175)
- 175.2 Matt 4-10 show this gathering business
- 176.1 comment on the word “gathered”: “A church that really thought itself ‘gathered’ would conceive that the Kingdom’s coming was complete. Charity and good sense demand that when we meet the term in ecumenical discussions, we attribute some less literal sense to it! To speak of a ‘gathering’ church, on the other hand, is to speak of a community which, for all the permeability of its skin, has a sharply defined core ... The church that gathers must have defined the central point to which it gathers.” (176) That point is the confession of Jesus as Lord, Christ. And this makes boundaries.

Authority point for 1.: “To recognise those who gather and to claim them for the community; to defy, where necessary, other communities which make rival claims on their allegiance; to rule out those who

do not make the apostolic confession: this is the authority which the Spirit confers upon the gathering church.” (176)

176.2 Unity is about this – gathering around the confession of Christ

177.1 Don't put in tension with diversity: “Diversity is the historical content of unity, the material in which the unity becomes concrete” (177). The church, like God, is one and many. “Were it not diverse it could never represent the world; did it not represent the world, it could not embody catholic unity but only sectarian division.” (177)

177.2 Unity of church, then, inheres in “the word of God acknowledging Jesus as his Son”. But what about schism / excomm etc?

177.3 these are just ways of trying to “explore and expound what *that* standard contained” (177) It is a “yes” to Christ as the one who has brought future judgment into the present.

177.4 “*Baptism* is the sign that marks the gathering community” (177) it is voluntary, conscious, single act

178.1 so what about infant baptism. DF not understand this para

178.2 2. “In response to the Passion of Christ the church is a *suffering community* ...” (178) - “in essence a martyr-community” (178). In Rev 20.4 – “the martyrs stand for the whole church”. “Actual martyrdom is simply the focal point of a conflict engaged through every variety of endurance” (179) BS 1

Authority point on 2.: “The authority conferred upon the suffering church, then, is the authority to confront and overcome resistance to God's saving will by enduring suffering in whatever form” (179)

179.1 most naturally is suffering in declaring Christ – martyr in both senses

179.2 II Cor 1 on this

179.3 like Christ in that this suffering is “*double representation* of the righteous God and of sinful mankind” (179) A witness “both to the righteousness of God and to the sin of the world” (180) BS 1

180.1 “The *eucharist* is the sign that marks the suffering community” (180). NOT as individuals but corporately as the body given shape by reference to the Passion

180.2 And as connected with the event of Christ's death (and therefore also his res-n) – this more important than all the feeding theologising – it is the Passover of the new exodus.

181.1 3. “In response to Christ's Exaltation the church is a *glad community*.” (181) No martyr complex in sense of neediness / resentment. Because in victory of Christ.

181.2 “glad in the resurrection of Christ ... as the *recovery of creation order*”. “Adam has recovered the original joy with which he greeted the creator's glory. If the church's gladness is the gladness of creation, that means it is the gladness of Jesus himself; for this renewed order of creation is present in him.” (181)

181.3 “Gladness is a moral attitude, a disposition of the affections appropriate to the recognition of God's creative goodness. Recalling Aristotle's observation that virtue is “feeling pleasure and pain at the right things” ...” ET 2 (181) To talk about gladness at renewed creation is to start talking ethics

182.1 I Peter on resurrection and gladness. “Joy ... is the decisive characteristic of the resurrection of life” ... “To live in resurrection gladness and hope is not a matter of momentary ebullience of spirit, but of a settled and resolute attitude. Joy must master our purposes.” (182)

182.2 So now we're talking about the moral life, about virtue etc. “This is a morality of a new creation in Christ ...a world made new in Christ” (183)

183.1 Based on delight at what God has done – delight in people you serve, in nature you control and use well. “At the heart of making and doing there lies discernment of what the world is and is meant for. Activity is responsive; otherwise it becomes tyrannous and destructive.” (183)

183.2 Authority point for 3.: “As the church participates in Christ's resurrection it is authorised to live joyfully in the order God has made, and to recover it from oppressive and exploitative corruptions.” (183)

Claiming the structures of life – does this in the household codes. These sometimes seen as conservative and moralistic but

- 183.4 they're not – Eph and Col are a) based on redemption and b) transformative: “The purpose of the catechesis is to defend that order, while stressing three qualifying factors: the mutuality of the duties; the fundamental equality of the persons; and the practical difference that these two factors make to the way the relation is interpreted.” (184)
- 184.1 The I Peter code goes the other way – it says that this order will be abused but that “In this case, however, the retrieval of created order rests on the witnessing individual, whose suffering with Christ is the source of his or her authority to reconstruct the expectations of others. (3.13ff.)” (184)
- 184.2 Slavery Major objection? Note first that we think that slavery is comprehensively bad whereas a chunk of what was then slavery is straightforwardly what we'd call employment, service etc now
- 185.1 Anyway, a massive change – “participants stood on a new footing of equality. They were both employees of Christ.” (185)
- 185.2 “It is wrong to think of the church as simply tolerating slavery because it could not abolish it. It believed that Christ had abolished it. ... Undoubtedly, the early church had no direct power over the law. But it might have claimed to have taken a more direct route. It knew something about law and liberation from it. With this law, as with all law, the key to freedom was the way in which one understood oneself in Christ. It was the slave-mind which produced unfree behaviour, and Christ had abolished the slave-mind.” (185)

Does that mean that legal status not matter? No, it does matter – I Cor 7.21. “Yet the essential element of freedom is already there. They have been liberated by the call of Christ, and they occupy their economic and social position with an altogether different standing, and as members of a community which affirms their standing.” (185)

- 186.1 “The *keeping of the Lord's Day* is the sign of the church's resurrection gladness.” (186) Modelled on the sabbath a) with pre-exilic emph which “celebrates creation in its comprehensive completeness: the putting of work aside marks the acceptance of God's finished work, which is the presupposition for all our own. But now it is Christ's resurrection that completes creation and vindicates creation order.” b) post-exilic “the holy day is a mark of the community's identity (cf. Isa. 56.1-8); but now the community is given identity not by its loyal waiting for redemption, but by its participation in fulfilment.” (186)
- 186.2 Most wdn't think of LD as sacrament. Fathers not think of it as sabbath: “With almost one accord ... the Fathers agreed the Lord's Day was not the sabbath. The third (fourth) command of the Decalogue was ceremonial, not moral, now fulfilled and superseded by Christ. The transference of the observance from the seventh to the 'eighth' day ... marked the supersession of time by eternity. The Reformers, on the other hand, treated the sabbath-command like the other nine, as a moral command, and identified the Lord's Day with the sabbath. If the Fathers' line of interpretation weakened the moral significance of the institution, the Reformers' tended to over-moralise it.” (186)
- 186.3 “In response to Christ's Exaltation the church is a community *that speaks the words of God.*” (186)
In two directions – prophecy and prayer.

Authority point for 4.: “its authorisation to deploy the powers of the Kingdom of God” (187) – remember that Christ establishes the Kingdom by God's word.

- 187.1 Thought process on this as characterisation of the Pentecostal church. Is it the powerful church? Or the praying church? What unites its miracles, its proclamation etc? Answer – “we characterise the Pentecostal church simply by its participation in divine speech, which is at the same time God's speech to us and ours to him, reflecting the two natures of Christ in hypostatic union.” (187)
- 187.2 *Prophecy* as speech – is a charism. Can't be confined to or contained in structured, organised ordained ministries. Protest against this sounds: “in place of the wind blowing freely where it list were heard the huffings and puffings of the synod.” (188)
- 188.1 Nature of prophecy – something new, not wholly predictable – but always consistent with Scripture
- 188.2 “Out of all its vocations the church prophesies: its administration, its charity, its music, its art, its theology, its politics, its religious ecstasy, its preaching. Prophecy is the archetypal charism, the

paradigm of all the others” (188). This is an address to the world. (But not of a private indiv but of the church as church) and it must come to the world.

- 188.3 *Prayer*. Activity of whole church in the individual. (Prophecy – the indiv does something on behalf of the church; Prayer – the church does something in the indiv). “the foundation for every other powerful speech [and itself ...] the speech which call upon God is power.” (189) - remember Rev 8.5
- 189.1 Prayer is power. Power is authority. Prayer effectively enables the church to be “the political community that it is, the community of God’s rule, manifesting his Kingdom to the world” (189). So actually, “The prayers of the church seek one thing only, the final manifestation of God’s rule on earth.” (189). “Prayer is invocation of the Spirit, calling upon God’s power *now* to witness to God’s power *then*.” (189)
- 189.2 Prayer for KG and for HS are parallel
- 190.1 “The *laying on of hands* is the sign of the church’s empowerment.” (190) Invokes the powers of the age to come and “especially the bestowal of the HS” (190). Esp in circs of weakness (ill, gt task, facing death). Is indiv – “it guards in a distinctive way against collectivism”. Use more – “The wider use of the laying-on of hands (not only in formal contexts which have become traditional) could do much to maintain the right relation of the individual believer to the community, and protect the church against the dangers of institutionalism and clericalism” (190)
- 190.2 Laying on of hands – “has the most impressive of NT credentials” (190). Mk 6.5, 8.23, Lk 4.40, 13.13 – heal; Mk 10.16 – bless children; healing – Acts 9.12, 17, 28.8; commission/ordain – Acts 6.6, 13.3; invoke on new disciples – 8.17ff, 19.6; ordination – I Tim 4.14, 5.22, II Tim 1.6; basic teaching – Heb 6.2.
- 191.1 What’s the narrative sequence / coherence in these 4 moments in which the church participates in and imitates the Christ-event? If 4 “dissociated tableaux” then we’ll end up with imbalanced church:
- the evangelical church of mission
- the romantic church of suffering
- the bourgeois-liberal church of social responsibility
- the catholic-charismatic church of triumph (191)
Two e.g.s of failed “coherence”: a) all history – moves from suffering to glory (e.g. at Constantine) b) indiv believer moves through them
- 191.2 These look for external coherence. Actually 4 moments have coherence of inner logic. Interplay between them all. Can test any one by any other. Growth, cross-fertilisation. (4) Powerful speech must flow from the (3) moral quality of the community that generates it; that moral life has been won through (2) proper suffering – in right way for right reason; suffering for thing worth suffering for requires (1) recognition of reality. Where (1) is advent – confession of faith; (2) is passion – suffering (3) is resurrection – moral life and (4) is exaltation – powerful speech.

Chapter Six: The obedience of rulers pp.193-242

Christendom: the doctrine of the Two pp.193-211

Mission or coercion? pp.211-226

The legacy of Christendom pp.226-242

Christendom: the doctrine of the Two pp.193-211

- 193.1 The early church success story. “Christ had gone up on high; he had led captivity captive, and given gifts to men. So the nations and rulers of the world were confronted with the rule of God, triumphantly present in a community that owned no other rule. No account of the pre-Nicene church can do it justice if it overlooks the extraordinary missionary triumphalism to which this faith gave rise. These Christians saw themselves riding on the wave of the future, conquering society with the word of truth and the blood of the martyrs, God’s own strategy for success.” (193)
- 193.2 Two addressees: a) society and b) rulers. Distinction demanded by fact that “Society and rulers have different destinies: the former is to be transformed ... the latter are to disappear, renouncing their sovereignty in the face of his.” (193) So do you address society and hope rulers get converted / fall in? That’s the missionary strat. But since now society is not interested, perhaps we can learn something from how the church has addressed rulers in the past.

- 194.1 Don't regret that the church addressed rulers in the past – was part of contextual theology once rulers had been converted
- 194.2 Why should we be interested in what the church has said to rulers in the past? "Its claim on us is simply that of witness. It attests, as a matter of history, the actual impact of the Christian faith on European politics, and it expounds this impact in its developed political reflections. Those who ruled in Christendom and those who thought and argued about government believed that the Gospel was true. They intended their institutions to reflect Christ's coming reign. We can criticise their understanding of the Gospel; we can criticise their applications of it; but we can no more be uninterested in their witness than an astronomer can be uninterested in what people see through telescopes. And while no testimony to Christ can safely be ignored, this one lays claim with a special seriousness; for although it is no longer our tradition, we are its *dénouement*, or perhaps its *débâcle*. It was the womb in which our late-modernity came to birth. Even our refusal of Christendom has been learned from Christendom. Its insights and errors have fashioned, sometimes by repetition and sometimes by reaction, the insights and errors which comprise the platitudes of our own era." (194)
- 194.3 So Christendom helps us understand Scripture and ourselves
- 195.1 Definition: "I use the term 'Christendom' ... to refer to a historical idea: that is to say, the idea of a professedly Christian secular political order ..." (195) and also "Christendom is an *era*, an era in which the truth of Christianity was taken to be a truth of secular politics." (195) "Let us say that the era lies between AD 313, the date of the Edict of Milan, and 1791, the date of the First Amendment to the US Constitution..." (195) Various forms "Yet the idea is always there, giving a unity to the whole era which entitles it to the name 'Christendom': it is the idea of a confessionally Christian government, at once 'secular' (in the proper sense of that word, confined to the present age) and obedient to Christ, a promise of the age of his unhindered rule." (195)
- 195.2 This is not an end of Christian mission or the church's project. "The church's one project is to witness to the Kingdom of God. Christendom is *response* to mission, and as such a sign that God has blessed it. It is constituted not by the church's seizing alien power, but by alien power's becoming attentive to the church." (195)
- 195.3 Ellul says some good things but makes "society rendered Christian" too much his direct aim. Christians didn't ask that. "The questions they did ask were of the kind: 'how shall I, as someone responsible for making *these* decisions, make them in obedience to Christ's command?' The traditional structures simply yielded ground as their officers sought to act under the authority of Christ." (196)
- 196.1 Two conceptions of Christendom:
 1. "In its primary form ... the Christendom idea supposes the *vis-à-vis* of church and secular government, as distinct structures belonging to distinct societies and, indeed, distinct eras of salvation-history." (196)
 2. "a new perspective emerges, that of a single homogeneous society with twin foci of authority" (196)
- "a Two-Kingdoms-Christendom and a Two-Governments-Christendom doctrine. The one supposes that the conversion of rulers leaves the underlying social *vis-à-vis* exactly where it was. The other introduces a unified doctrine of society holding the twin peaks of authority together in a common social context. The ambiguities which surround the Christendom idea arise chiefly from this latter development of it."
- 196.2 But even within type-2 – "Two-Govts-Xndom" there were various attempts to "reassert the missionary *vis-à-vis*". "The qn which created the turbulence of church-state relations in the West was how the sign of Christ's victory could be protected against subversion, which would leave the church in a Babylonian captivity to its own Christian rulers. It was always understood that the church had not attained its final glory 'merely because the kings serve it, wherein lies greater and more perilous temptation' (Augustine, *De perfectione iustitiae*15.35)" (196-7)
- History of Xn political thought – 300-1600:
 1. The rout of the demons – pp.197-99
 2. Redefining the boundary – pp.199-203
 3. Two rules – pp.203-205
 4. The supremacy of the spiritual authority – pp.205-206
 5. The authority of word alone – pp.206-209
 6. Restoring the balance – pp.209-211
- 197.1 1. *The rout of the demons*

Eusebius's celebration of Constantine "have come to be seen as the archtype of ignoble theological legitimation" (197) But ...

- 197.2 His basic line is "look what has happened!" ... "we are simply dared to disbelieve." (198)
("Later Byzantine apologists drew from Eus. A cosmic understanding of the emperor's role: divine sov-y is mediated by the Word of God to the King, who, conforming his rule to God's, becomes a kind of paradigm man, the philosopher-king of the Platonic tradition." (198) Look, he's here. The real thing. Kingdom arrived
- 198.1 Creation of single empire and abolition of human sacrifice at time of Jesus were signs of coming kingdom. But Constantine is real revelation of God's victory. Previous emperors were persecutors. C, "alone of all that wielded the Roman power ... the friend of God" (Eus q by OOD 198). "He was God's champion, not the heir of the Caesars." (198)
- 198.2 Was there a loss of eschatology now – nothing left to happen? "The divine rule, with all its attributes, had become luminously present in the royal man." (198). Well, later Xn pol wd have to a) "recover the future horizon" and b) "redefine the present boundary between God and Caesar" but cdn't do so ignoring E's gt claim of emphatic change.
- 199.1 2. *Redefining the Boundary*.
'Ambrosiaster': "a king bears the image of God, a bishop the image of Christ". (199). Two strands here:
a) govt is an older, more universal, more general, less redemptive-historically determined auth-y
b) the emperor is to behave as a Xn
- 199.2 Ambrose Strand a) Denies emperor's jurisdiction over church. "Matters of faith should be handled in the church." (q.199)
- 199.3 How define church? Clergy? Actually, more like church-building!. These prove existence of Christian society. A even "discouraged pastoral visiting in the homes of laity. The proper place for Christians to meet their clergy was the basilica..." (200)
- 200.1 Strand b) Emperor not immune from church!. "On several occasions A withdrew communion from emperors, sometimes for moral, sometimes for doctrinal causes." (200)
- 200.2 Then this develops to be sort of advice to emperor not to be too strict – as though being a Xn emperor meant not punishing too harshly – "It is necessary for judgment to yield to religion" he declared in a succinct statement of salvation-history" (200)
- 201.1 Sort of saying, "It's up to you, of course, but if you acted like a Xn then probably you'd punish less." Sometimes goes further – AD390 censure for Theodosius's massacre of Thess. "In censuring him the church took up the task of judging judges, and began the slow work of reforming the criteria of earthly justice, marking certain acts of retribution out of bounds." (201) "Justice is to have a new evangelical content." (201)
- 201.2 A went too far in dissuading T "from punishing a bishop who had roused a mob to burn a Jewish synagogue". A saw this as part of march of history and T getting in the way. But he shd realize that "It is necessary for judgment to yield to religion." (201)
- "Modern susceptibility ... is quick to assume the possibility of a neutral and impartial relation of govt to religious rivals, an idea with its own difficulties ..." (201)
- 201.3 Augustine Recog that lines blurred but not cos spiritual realities were. "The two were distinguished by polar opposite moral principles ('Two loves made two cities ...' – *City of God* 14.28)" (202)
- 202.1 That blurring / intersection b/w govt and church auth (in spite of two cities distinction) in part cos both aiming for same broad end: "The sharp distinction b/w pol and pastoral tasks began to be smudged over as emp's and bishop's riles converged upon a single end, 'the common good and the security of the republic', an end which was, in fact, nothing other than God himself (*Ep* 137.17, 138.10)
- 202.2 Pastoral metaphor for both emp and bish auth. So church takes on some community govt. And also "justified the official coercion of heretics as an act of adjunct pastoral care performed for the assistance of the church by the Christian emperor." (202)
- 203.1 Some deny "identification of the two cities with Rome and the church". They are wrong to – see *Ep* 95.5 and *City of God* 16.2,3. The two cities are not "purely ideal entities".

- 203.2 3. *Two rules.*
 Gelasius takes this further. His “famous dictum transfers the duality from the level of *society* (“Two loves made two cities”) to the level of *government* (“Two there are by whom this world is ruled as princes”). Sacred and secular rulers function within one universal society.” (203) And these two distinct parallel and opposite roles are necessarily distributed because Christ is the last and ultimate priest-king. “the priestly-royal character of Christ’s church is not for one individual alone to reflect but depends upon mutual service.” (203)
- 203.3 Then a *further* step in Carolingian age. Moves to “Two there are by whom the *church* is ruled”. Now kings become lay officers within the church. They used to be outside the church protecting or defending it. Not now. From two societies to two rules within society to two rules functioning within church (and society subsumed to church).
- 204.1 So that “the burden of distinction now fell wholly upon the two governing offices of priest and ruler.” “Differentiation being sacrificed to equilibrium, the two offices turning into each others’ shadows... “ – and competition between two offices within the church-society. (Which is v different between eschat conflict between two civilizations/societies).
- 204.2 An interesting 12th C doct – *York Tractates*
- 205.1 4. *The supremacy of spiritual authority*
 Reforms under Gregory – late 11th C. Some elements of “eschat conflict with the principalities and powers” but “the principal thrust, then, of Gregorian apologetic was to redefine the equilibrium within the church” (205). Spiritual auth is the soul and emp/vis soc is the body. But now “pull the clergy out from their pol and feudal loyalties” and make them “judicially and fiscally a race apart” (205)
- 205.2 New emphasis – “spiritual rule must have priority over the secular ... pope ... the right to depose apostate rules and to absolves Christian subjects from their oaths of allegiance.” (205)
- 205.3 This claim developed over next two centuries. “The basic material of pol order, the thirteenth-century apologists argued, was sheer conquest and exertion of force; but that material on its own cannot constitute political right, but requires the ‘form’ of justice. But justice is ‘a spiritual thing’ (*res spiritualis*, Giles of Rome), and must be supplied by spiritual agents in society. Any society that has developed pol authority (as distinct from mere force) has done so only by involving priesthood in the legitimation and direction of its rulers.” (206) !!!
- 206.1 At their best these papal apologists “had the vision of a universal jurisdiction ... constituted by a court of last resort, a ruler of rulers ... it would be the rule of justice.” Pope wd provide justice (key requisite for any political order). Have these various parties, militaries, gangs etc competing for dominion. Pol system one of conflicting interests. “This loss of disinterestedness in the pol system had to be made good by a competent auth. The pope, it was claimed owned all property, not ‘in particular’ but ‘universally’; we might say, all property rights that others exercised were grounded in his authority.” (206)
- 206.2 5. *The authority of word alone.*
 Aristotelian renaissance of 13th C – extends the “hierarchy of nature and supernature” and thus seems to confirm the “pre-eminence of ecclesiastical jurisdiction” (206-7). But longer term it gives indep, “natural” foundation for pol authority and restores idea that “justice itself was a natural virtue” (207).
- 207.1 Add to that the subversiveness of the Franciscan “absolute poverty” claims – when papal auth “lay in a chain of submerged equivalences: property meant power; power meant jurisdiction; jurisdiction meant authority; and authority meant a determinative role for the church in shaping society.” Franciscans unravel this.
- 207.2 Leads to a different basis for auth-y than property – a spiritual one. Auth-y of the word.
- 207.3 Marsilius of Padua – *Defender of the Peace* 1324 – uses Arist stuff and Franciscan stuff and imperial case v papal claims, and idea of “the genesis of government from the popular will” (208). Put all together and it’s quite an attack on papal claims to supremacy of eccles auth.
- 208.1 MP says Christ’s judgt future so two diff-t sorts of auth. Earthly polit auth has coercion but ltd ability. Eccles auth does real stuff but lacks coercive power – only the auth of the truth.

- 208.2 So have division of auth into “spheres of competence” (208). Secular auth has all admin and governmental functions (including within the church! – it is, after all, part of society). And church has the truth which explains and confirms the secular auth.
- 208.3 Problems with this compartmentalization: does Gospel auth not have social structure implied? Doesn’t sec auth need truth foundation? (If not then looks like might is right – either the sec auth has justice (but definition and announcement of that is the church’s sphere) or it doesn’t. If not then might is right.)
- 209.1 Luther’s use of this separation / compartmentalization. Starts as though talking two kingdoms but ends up talking about two govts. Leaves verbal crit of the sec auth the only pol auth of the church.
- 209.2 And then turns this “distinction of spiritual and secular” from social to a psychological reality in the individual. “Every Christian bears ‘two persons’” (209) - an inner (“realm of mind and heart”) and an outer (“realm of social relations”).
- 209.3 *6. Restoring the balance.*
Attempted recovery of what was about to be lost (pol auth of church; social demand/reality of gospel; Christendom)
- 210.1 Salamanca school – Suarez/Vitoria. “The secular power was deemed ‘supreme in its own order’” (210) “Only when the welfare of the universal church was at stake had the spiritual power any *locus standi* in directing the acts of Christian kings.” (210) Abandonment of “an evangelical basis for civil rule and justice. Political order was founded solely on Natural Law ... Christ’s kingship was exclusively spiritual.” (210) Oh dear, oh dear, oh dear. “The nature-grace distinction of the Aristotelian schoolmen was put to new work in providing the basis for a secular-ecclesiastic duality.” (210)
- 210.2 Calvinists also resisting papal claims but from opposite direction. “They were disaffected with an authority to pronounce which conferred no social independence. They wished to claim back the church’s social space.” (210)
- 210.3 Agreed that church’s authy was that of the word but wanted to show that that word “could extend into a structured church authority.” By a) explaining “a scripturally ordained structure of ministry” and b) showing the “jurisdiction” of “discipline” they laid ground for this extension.
- 211.1 That was city state not pol-y irrelevant. Localism (not re popes and emperors but re elders and town meetings) “arranged in local units of a size that groups of ministers and lay elders could meet in consistory ... this created a powerful engine of shared lay-clerical decision-making at local level.” (211)

Mission or coercion? pp.211-226

- 211.2 Reminder that Christian political theology is eschatological. All about the passing age, the new age, the victory of Christ over the powers. “Secular institutions have a role confined to this passing age (*saeculum*). They do not represent the arrival of the new age and the rule of God. They have to do with the perennial cycle of birth and death which makes tradition, not with the resurrection of the dead which supersedes all tradition. The corresponding term to ‘secular’ is not ‘sacred’, nor ‘spiritual’, but ‘eternal’.” (211). Secular auths are “Christ’s conquered enemies; yet they have an indirect testimony to give, bearing the marks of his sovereignty imposed upon them, negating their pretensions and evoking their acknowledgment. Like the surface of a planet, pocked with craters by the bombardment it receives from space, the governments of the passing age show the impact of Christ’s dawning glory. This witness of the secular is the central core of Christendom.” (212)
- 212.1 Opponents of Xndom. Natural-rights or communitarians – both oppose “what looks like compelled belief”. But is that part of the Xndom idea? Two analytical observations first: ...
- 212.2 1. “The Xndom idea has to be located correctly as an aspect of the church’s understanding of *mission*.” (212) Whether conversion of state, church-state dialectic, what needed for mission in 11th C or 14th C or among Calvinists – mission was the driver. Problem is “Once the two societies came to be seen as a single society, it was more difficult to frame the church-state partnership in terms of the eschatological Kingdom. It cd seem, by a kind of optical illusion, that there was no more mission to be done.” (212)

“The peril of the Xndom idea – precisely the same peril that attends upon the post-Xndom idea of the religiously neutral state – was that of negative collusion: the pretence that there was now no further challenge to be issued to the rulers in the name of the ruling Christ.” (213)

- 213.1 Barth's mission concern and his politics.
- 213.2 B's thesis of the 'analogy' of state and church: "The existence of the State [is] an allegory ... a correspondence and an analogue to the K of God which the church preaches and believes in' (p.32). The NT image for the final hope is 'not ... an eternal church but ... the *polis* built by God' (p.19). In the witness to the KG the state forms the 'outer circle', the church the 'inner circle', with the K at their centre." So if State is to hear what the KG says to it (and be the witness to the KG that it is meant to be), it must do so *through* the proclamation of the church.
- 214.1 There are continuing tensions but they must be addressed in mission.
- 214.5 Mission – making victory of Christ known. Also means discerning Antichrist. 19th C optimism underestimated this. Key feature of Antichrist – "the convergence in one subject of claims to earthly political rule and heavenly soteriological mediation." (214) "The rejection of Antichrist is the rejection of a unified political and theological authority other than that which is vested in Christ's own person." (214-5)
- 215.1 Martyrdom goes with mission, though "A church too determined to be at home in the world will be unprepared for this, and so unprepared for mission." (215)
- 215.2 Because martyr is witness, it is not just awkward squad but the positing of a true vision. So that when martyrs are honoured it is a recognition of the victory of Christ.
- 215.3 Contra Hauerwas – "His attack on Xndom, which he often denominates as 'Constantinianism', seems to be founded on the premise: Christendom/Cons-m is constituted by the improper acquisition of worldly power by the church." (215) H says 'Christians were attempting to further the kingdom through the power of this world.' (q 216). "No historical justification is offered for this claim, and I am afraid I think it is simply wrong. That is not what Christians were attempting to do. Their own account of what happened was that those who held power became subject to the rule of Christ." (216)
- 216.1 Triumph of Christ is not itself triumphalism.
- 216.2 "The triumph of Christ among the nations H is not prepared to see. His Xity is marked by a kind of return to the catacombs." (216) For H it is all about dying. 'Genuine politics is about the art of dying.' (q. 216)
- 216.3 But H has forgotten the resurrection! For H, "the very hope of vindication, which gave the martyrs their courage, has come to look like a temptation."
- 217.1 2. Christendom idea "describes a *mutual service* between the two authorities, predicated on the difference and balance of their roles." (217) "The unhappy tension which tormented the classical world, between the philosopher with his truth and the ruler with his power, is overcome in the Word of God." (217). Church speaks a word of power to civil authority which leads either to martyrdom or mutual service.
- 217.2 What the state does for the church. It "facilitate[s] its mission" (217). Can't do it but can facilitate. "first, simply by performing its own business responsibly and with modest pretensions. In the Xn era there is no neutral performance on the part of rulers; either they accommodate to the energy of the divine mission, or they hurl themselves into defiance." (217)
- 217.3 Also "there may be a conscious facilitation, based on the recognition of the church and acknowledgment of its mission." (217). Establishment (in various forms) is one way. "Recognition implies some respect on the part of the rulers for the church's leaders, and a willingness to listen to them as they explain the church's tasks." (217) But reinforcing church discipline or defending the church is a step too far – Christ does that.
- 218.1 Hobbes (yes, Hobbes!) too far here because confused. "For a Christian to be a secular ruler is a *vocation* ... it is not a *charism*." (218) Hobbes confuses these.
- 219.1 "The most truly Christian state understands itself most thoroughly as 'secular'. It makes the confession of Christ's victory and accepts the relegation of its own authority." (219) So the church helps the state by reminding it of its limited jurisdiction and duration! "The ruler may belong within the church, too, but not *qua* ruler. The essential element in the conversion of the ruling power is the change in its self-understanding and its manner of government to suit the dawning age of Christ's own rule. The church has to instruct it in the ways of the humble state." (219)

- 219.2 What are those ways? Where NT tell us? Certainly mustn't confuse instructing the state with the task of evangelism.
- 220.1 Resuming the qn (212.1). The charge of "religious compulsion". Certainly the church has tried it – ask the Jews!
- 220.2 Weird [DF] continuing Israel stuff. Church wanted to extinguish/subsume Israel.
- 221.1 So is Xndom coercive or not? "is there not something implicitly coercive in the very attempt to define a secular govt as Xn? Does it not make some members of society 'outsiders', even if they are treated well as such? And is not the fundamental right of religious dissidents the right *not to have to be* religious dissidents?" (These sorts qns are what cause discomfort). (221)
- 221.2 These are modern lib rather than classic lib qns. Classic libs thought of right and wrong and rational progress and declaring things out of court and so on.
- 221.3 But modern libs argue this way: ... "It has come to seem perilous to allow persuasions of any kind, however reached, to shape the ordering of society. Doctrines that shape society are pol-l doctrines, and all pol-l doctrines are by their nature coercive." (221) Even lib doctrines are coercive but we keep them to a min as "the minimum formal conditions for social existence." And even if we knew we knew more than this, we'd still keep estab docts to a min-m.
- 222.1 But shd notice that its not govts that make dissidents/outsiders, it is society as such. If 10 people hold a view and 1 doesn't then it's not govt which has made that one an outsider. (Though govt may formalise it). "We are left with the suspicion that this lib view springs from a radical suspicion of society as such and of the agreements that constitute it."
- 222.2 But note that this actually makes any group of people declaring X is true and Y is false to be coercive (cos it "makes" people into outsiders) ! "If there is no religious test on the right to vote, or to have access to education or medical care, why should there be one on attending Mass and receiving communion."
- 222.3 "In particular the neo-liberal thesis is incompat with a narrative theology which professes that agreement on a common 'story' is an essential element in social identity." (222) Which is ironic since narrative theology communitarians are often keen pluralists / anti-Xndom-ists.
- 223.1 Yoder, for example. Almost reduces Xity to the principle of "voluntaneity". Everything is about individual liberty.
- 223.2 What's with this? The church is not a 'voluntary society', thankfully. And thinking of this way is just fitting in with "late-modern expectations of how civil society will be organised" (224) "Is Y, in the name of non-conformity, not championing a great conformism, lining the church up with the sports clubs, friendly societies, colleges, symphony subscription-guilds, political parties and so on, just to prove that the church offers late-modern order no serious threat?" (224)
- 224.1 "The idea of a Christian state, then, need not be the idea of a coercive state." (224) Can have constitutional (voted for!) Xndom. Which may go as well as come. "Like various aspects of the church's life, the Christian state may be disclosed from time to time as a sign of the Kingdom, disappearing at one moment to return at another." (224)
- 224.2 Civil religion – domestication of the church and legitimation of the state – a bigger danger than coercion/the church persecuting by means of the state.
- 224.3 Hauerwas hates, truly hates civil religion. Maybe a new "pluralistic" civil religion is on the way. "the pressure to accommodate religious pluralism as a permanent feature of civil society". (225)
- 225.1 Forms of civil religion: bolstering the state's legit-y; inculcating civic virtues; "never mind how you vote, just make sure you go to the poll!" etc. (Looks polit neutral but is deeply complicit). Sometimes Christian crit-m needs "to send a message of disapproval not to the governing party but to the polit classes at large." (225)
- 225.2 All part of losing Gospel's critical edge. "accommodating the demands of the Gospel to the expectations of society." (225) "Any successful mission will leave the church inculturated; any inculturated church is liable to lose its critical distance on society." (225) Then gets involved in intra-mural argts and

“Echoing political controversy, rather than calling its grounds in question, is the sign of a Babylonian captivity.” (226) “Much Xn enthus-m for ‘pluralism’ has less to do with a relation to the state than with the church’s yearning to sound in harmony with the commonplaces of the stock exchange, the law-courts and the public schools. It is simply the modern Western version of ‘Water-buffalo theology’.” (226)

The legacy of Christendom pp.226-242

- 226.1 Legacy “still apparent in the institutions of Europe and America” and in “a fruitful constellation of social and political ideas” (226). These from the 16th and 17th Cs – are they then the work of Prot-t radicalism or the beginnings of modern secularism? Neither both ideologically and institutionally they go much further back.
- 226.2 Let’s call this legacy “early modern liberalism”. Not because it is modern democracy but because it is in some imp’t ways the foundation for it and in continuity with it.
- 227.1 “To what extent is Christian political thought tied to the liberal tradition?” (227) Althaus at time of Barmen Dec-n and Latin American theologians who suspect “they saw in liberal preoccupations something of a bourgeois ideology” (227) both thought that Xn pol theory shd not assume bound to Western democ-y. The lib trad has served well but is it the only answer to how express Xn pol-l theory?
- 227.2 Critms of liberal tradition
a) late 19th C RC – e.g. Chesterton – blame Ref-n for it and respond “with an enthusiastic championing of what they saw as the medieval ideal of a humanistic, inculturated, Xn faith, an antidote to the voluntarism of the modern era.” (228)
b) less romantic crit-m from e.g. Ellul – “when reflection on the meaning of technol-l progress and the interpenetration of the liberal order with dizzying levels of violence demanded new attempts to think about modernity as a cultural whole.” (228)
c) crit-m of modernity gathers pace and it’s clear that lib trad-n is a Xn not just a Prot “problem”
- 228.1 Modernity-criticism has grown up. “As it has gained in sophistication, modernity-criticism has shown more clearly the multiplicity of threads from which the fabric is woven, and so has allowed us to think of other liberalisms, different possibilities of combination and dev’t than those which have woven our contemp bondage. By way of this closer view of the weaving of modernity, we are free to discern both the triumph of Christ in liberal instits and the coming of the Antichrist.” (228)
- 228.2 Whole para!
“The liberal trad-n, however, has right of possession. There is no other model available to us of a political order derived from a mill-m of close engagement between state and church. It ought, therefore, to have the first word in any discussion of what Xns can approve, even if it ought not to have the last word. To think through the demands of the Gospel in unfamiliar circs, we must have understood its demands in familiar ones; and nothing whatever is gained by a posture of studied distance from the legacy of Xn pol reasoning. If the church has to formulate, not an abstract statement of what might *in principle* be conceded to pol-l auth-y, but a challenge to an existing pol-l sit-n, then let it begin from the challenge the state has already heard and already responded to. We cannot simply go behind it; it has the status of a church trad-n, and demands to be treated with respect.” (228-9)
- 229.1 Two qualifications.
1. Must be discerning – “The fact that something *is* done or said, and that it *has been* done or said, does not invest it with the auth-y of trad-n in a theological sense; but only as it is shown to be organically derived from the guiding principles of Xn society.” (229)
- 229.2 2. It’s tradition not revelation – “it cannot merely be assumed or posited.” (229) Must demonstrate that it is actually predicated on the decisive shift accomplished in history by Christ. There *is* a political order founded by Christ which allows us to discuss the best configurations of it. Two ways in which pol-l thought has failed to grasp the actuality of Christ’s victory in history – socialism and liberalism. Socialism “by exaggerating the capacity of history for immanent transformation, so that social order is predicated on a human nature different from that with which we actually have to deal, liberalism ... by refusing to accommodate movement in history at all.” I.e. soc-m thinks arrive by forces within history – not come to terms with Xt’s eschat work. Lib-m thinks all is OK and always has been – not come to terms with Xt’s eschat work. (229)
- 230.1 Note, too, that trying to impose lib democracy apart from Xndom foundation for it is a form of “cultural imperialism” – just an export of humanist sensibilities.

- 230.2 But it is poss to draw a picture of a “normative political culture” which is what Xndom shd and at best does look like in formation and determination of liberal tradition. Note though
 (i) it must be genuinely political – “it must accommodate political auth-y, the conjunction of power, right and tradition mediating the divine rule”
 (ii) it must relate properly to church as form of pol-l auth and rule and community
 (iii) “We must differentiate, and maintain complementarity between, the conception of government, on the one hand (‘political’ doctrine in the proper sense), and the conception of society (‘social’ doctrine) on the other.” 231)
 Look at political for rest of chapter and social in next chapter.
- 231.1 Main thing: “The political doctrine that emerged from Xndom is characterised by a notion that government is responsible. Rulers, overcome by Christ’s victory, exist provisionally and on sufferance for specific purposes. In the church they have to confront a society which witnesses to the Kingdom under which they stand and before which they must disappear. It is to that conception we refer when we describe pol-l auth-y in terms of the ‘state’ ...” (231) State is a modern notion. Not mean the community. Not the source of identity for all. Is limited. Can understand self apart from it and over against it. And that distancing is a gift of the victory of Christ.
- 232.1 Idea of state is a Christian devt of the idea of empire in two respects – relates to a) victory and b) law. Both now, of course, defined by the history-changing work of Christ.
- 232.2 Cullmann’s *State in the NT* writes as though ‘state’ meant something in 1st C and now and we cd discuss the ‘state’ and Jesus and Paul’s doctrine of it somewhat timelessly – e.g. as ‘the totalitarian claims of the Roman state’ or the ‘theocratic ideal of Judaism’ (both Cullmann’s phrases q 232). But no such conception existed – it was brought about by a change in history wrought by Christ. Cullmann, of all scholars, shd reckon with salvn-hist-l shifts!
- 233.1 Whole para – this is stunning! ...
 “The responsible state is the *bene esse* which corresponds to the *esse* of political authority. The latter we described in chapter two as the union of power, the execution of right and the perpetuation of tradition in one centre of action. In chapter four we marked the transition from *esse* to *bene esse* in terms of the execution of right, which justified the persistence of secular authority until the full appearing of the Kingdom. But the *bene esse* cannot undo the *esse*. The subjection of all authorities to Christ’s authority does not mean the dissolution of authority. The conjunction of power, judgment and tradition defines what political authority *is*. A judge has no authority apart from a constable to enforce his rulings and a community to bring pleas to his court. Power and community tradition are still essential to establish authority; the new development is that they are subordinated to just judgment as means to an end. The accumulation of power and the maintenance of community identity cease to be self-evident goods; they have to be justified at every point by their contribution to the judicial function. The responsible state is therefore minimally coercive and minimally representative. Not everything that it could cause to happen should it cause to happen; and not every energy within society that it could maintain should it maintain, but only what is necessary to its task of judging causes. This is not a restraint imposed by the nature of political authority as such, which can thrive on excesses of traditional legitimation and on splendid displays of force; it is imposed by the limits conceded to secular authority by Christ’s Kingdom. The most striking instance of this reorientation of politics to the task of justice is provided by those sixteenth-century thinkers who developed the theory of war, interpreting it within the restrictive canons of a judicial act performed by judicial criteria.”
 i.e. the role of the state is now determined by its judicial function and the power and representation aspects are now means to that end.
- 233.2 “The state exists in order to give judgment; but under the auth-y of Christ’s rule it gives judgment *under law*, never as its own law. One might say that the only sense of pol-l auth-y acknowledged within Xndom was the law of the ascended Christ, and that all pol-l auth-y was the auth-y of that law.” (233). Law in OT was one – now in two streams – a) the HS, heart, intimate law in the church and
- 234.1 b) Yhwh’s “commanding rule over the rulers ... the decree of Yhwh (Ps.2.7-9)” (234). “Certain key convictions about law became formalised in Xn Europe: all law derives from the will of God; all law is one; all secular rulers are subject to law.” (234) Indep sources of law become suspect. And “in that great work of synthetic theological imagination, Thomas Aquinas’ *Treatise on Law (ST II-I qq.90-106)*, what shd attract our notice is not the much-discussed treatment of Natural Law But the architectonic conception of law as a unified structure finding its source in God’s creative decrees for universal existence.” (234)

- 234.2 The primacy and ultimacy of God's law. "The legis-ve activity of princes, then, was not a beginning in itself; it was an answer to the prior lawmaking of God in Christ, under which it must be judged. Xndom in effect refused the classical commonplace that the ruler was a 'living law', his personal auth-y indistinguishable from the auth-y of the law he gave ... the sov's decree had no legal substance if it ran counter to divine law, natural or revealed." (234) Human law is derived, promulgatory, dependent on, administrative of God's law.
- 234.3 OK, so govt in gen legitimated by the judicial function. What about a particular govt? Can't claim to represent a people nor to gain auth-y by victory because both of these have been undermined / relativized by Christ's Kingdom achievement. How claim a people and a jurisdiction? "Govt appears like a fortress erected on an island which the sea is washing away" (235) (And, subordinately, how claim hereditary principle given that it's all about subjection to Christ?)
- 235.1 Wyclif – never mind hereditary principle – it's spiritual sonship that counts. Virtue alone is the title to rule. That comes from sonship to God. "Spiritual generation, then, is what counts" (235)
- 235.2 Several phases "in the attempt to answer the qn of representative legitimacy".
 1) Empire – univ secular govt fits with univ church? BUT
 a) Antichrist also has one-world rule!
 b) only the **church** can be universal
 c) univ scope of Christ's law does the "universal" piece fine. (and note that concept of *international law* is a Xndom invention)
- 236.1 2) Kingship – divine appt of the king. Divine providential rule over kingdoms. BUT
 a) not just providence – what about law? "*Lex facit regem*" So "we witness the birth of constitutional law ... law not only proceeds from the ruler; it precedes him. His own legitimation must be a matter of appeal to law." (236) ("With this, political authority begins to be conceived as office." (237))
- 237.1 3) Constitutionalism / element of voluntarism. About the relation of the ruler to the people – "defined in terms of a hypothetical act performed in common ... a 'perfect society' ... act of collective will." (237) But at this stage of devt the "act of will" recognises / is the occasion for the rep-ve legitimization rather than the source/basis of it (as in later contractarianism).
- 237.2 Vitoria makes this (occasion / source) distinction – "that the polit comm-y does not transfer *potestas* but *propria auctoritas* is to be understood to mean that society authorises the particular ruler to occupy the seat of polit auth-y, but in doing so does not alienate an auth-y of its own or bring into existence a second auth-y alongside its own." (238)
- 238.1 Deposing tyrants flows from this – "An impt devt of the constit-l idea was the attempt to bring the act of deposing a ruler within the scope of lawful polit action." (238). John of Salisbury: "The tyrant is a figure hostile to the common good; he attacks law, and law is superiors even to emperors. To slay the tyrant is to defend the law, an act on behalf of, rather than against, public order." (OOD 238). This led to "make a distinction between the office of the ruler and the person who occupied it, so that to remove an unworthy occupant was not necessarily to resist the authority of the office." (238). But by what mechanisms cd this be done?
- 238.2 JS – *Policraticus* (c.1155) – "to slay the tyrant is not merely licit, it is equitable and right ... tyranny is a 'more than public crime' since it attacks laws." (238). Two criteria for discerning tyranny – usurpation and opposition to law. Thomas's discussion concentrates on the second - using Aristotle's *Politics* definition of a tyrant – one who "seeks his own advantage from rule, not the good of the multitude that is subject to him." Move on from that - "From tyranny no law can be derived (*ST II-I q.95.4*) ... hence 'the overthrow of such a regime does not have the character of sedition.'" (239) "Public order to be converted into a private feoff ... a regime so unqualifiedly private..." (239). Nevertheless, sometimes "the civil disturbance of an insurrection may be an evil disproportionate to the civil good intended." (239)
- 239.1 Actually, not just rulers who've turned into "private" rulers. Sometimes (e.g. elections) "there is within the structure of political order itself a principle that allows the correction of an abusive ruler. Marsilius of Padua "makes a distinction between the sovereign's office and the person who, capable of false opinion and perverse desire, can be judged by the very law that flows from his office." (239)

Note, though that "since the removal of a ruler is an act of law, not an act performed in a legal vacuum, it must be done lawfully." (239)

- 240.1 But no anarchy – you obey until tyrant is removed and unless you are confident to get rid of him. “Another element of discipline is now introduced. Since there is no political vacuum, there is no licence for anarchy. The ruler who may be deposed for his crimes remains, until removal, an authority who demands obedience. Wyclif argues that Xns ought to obey tyrannical powers (*De civili dominio*) on the ground that the subject must consent to just political order in principle, and in doing so is not consenting to occasional abuse.” (240) W teaches that “the consent they yield in paying taxes is consent to govt as such, not to abuses.” (240). “But after all that, W springs a surprise characteristic of this most disconcerting of political thinkers. He adds almost in passing that if the refusal to pay tax is actually likely to correct the abuse or overthrow tyranny, then we ought to refuse with that intention. In other words: refusal of obedience is justified only as an element in a really serious strategy of revolution!” (240)
- 240.2 16th C formulations of the mechanism:
 a) Calvin etc – “private persons may not act alone. There are certain officials (‘ephors’ as they liked to call them) on whom rests the duty of correcting, restraining and, if necessary, removing the chief magistrate.” (240)
 b) John Knox – appeal direct to divine law
 c) John Ponet – appeal direct to natural law.
 “But for all of them the removal of a corrupt ruler is an expression of the operation of the rule of law.” (240)
- 240.3 “The legal-constitutional conception is the essence of Christendom’s legacy” NB NB (240) Things began to drift away from it by developing an independent sense of “sovereignty”. In contract-theory, “the ruler’s primary responsibility ceased to be thought of as being to divine law, but rather to the people whose supposed act constituted him. This act of popular will came to be thought of as the source of all law and constitutional order.” (240-1) “‘Sovereignty’ became a corporate personality, or source of will, which gave the body politic its identity.” (241)
- 241.1 Then get a thing called the “nation-state” – over against collapsing natural law, “the immanent political form within society has reasserted itself” (241). But this “thing” is generally thought to be unsustainable. “On all sides pundits proclaim that the nation-state is in trouble. The truth is, it has been in trouble ever since Christ rose from the dead.” (241)
- 241.2 But if will qualify the claims of nations (etc – other units) then need to do so with something which has “sufficient representative authority”. (241) Because Xn polit culture is “also engaged on the side of social authenticity” – it’s not about bare assertion or unassented to imposition. On one side, human law-giving is bounded (politically) by the law of God over the state. On the other side, the state has to give “deference” (socially) to society’s “spontaneities” also understood and derived from the law of God.

Chapter Seven: The redemption of society pp.243-284

The end of Christendom pp.243-252

Liberal society pp.252-271

Modernity and menace pp.271-284

The end of Christendom pp.243-252

- 243.1 Mission aimed at obedience of society and of rulers. Two different objectives – salvation of the one and the submission / surrender of the other. One lasts for ever. Other is temporal. “Communities are incorporated into Yhwh’s Kingdom; rulers merely resign their pretensions.” (243) And there’s an order – first society, then rulers. But not end there. Rulers’ submission is a “moment in the gathering of many societies into one” (243).
- 243.2 So talk about “After Christendom”? Yes, eschatologically – “Since Xndom has ... to do with the submission of rulers, it prepares the way for something beyond itself, the replacement of rulers by the Christ.” (243). But opponents (historicists) turn “After Christendom” into “that way of thinking has had its day ... it’s over now”. And “the historicist conception directs the church to a social mission without a political aspect to it. The moment for the conversion of political agency is, in its view, past.” (244)
- 244.1 Well, of course, Xndom in one sense is over (though some vestiges remain). There is “a prevailing ethos which demands that we accept the end of Xndom. The ethos is usually expressed in terms of a doctrine

of 'separation of church and state', an uncommunicative formula, to be sure" (244). Means to "deny at least one element in the Xndom idea: that the state shd offer deliberate assistance to the church's mission." *(244)

- 244.2 First Amendment of US Constitution a "paradigm assertion of this doctrine and ... the symbolic end of Xndom". Oddly formed by Xns who wanted to deny govt interference in spiritual things so that they cd get on with winning whole of society. Cheered on by anti-trinitarian heretics and rationalists. But ends up with "a concept of ... a state freed from all responsibility to recognise God's self-disclosure in history." (245)
- 245.1 "They had no thought of religious pluralism ... They [DF simply / merely] wished to overthrow [DF – for their positive religious reasons] the legal tie between the Crown and the church that existed in England." (245)
- 245.2 Largely because they didn't agree with the current settlement – wanted freedom to be themselves religiously not to not be religious.
- 246.1 The establ religion in England was increasingly Deist and minimalist. So the thorough-going Deists and the warm-hearted evangelicals agreed that it'd be better to disestablish.
- 246.2 Then the factionalism did socially in the 19th C what it had achieved politically in the 18th C. "social institutions, notably schools, were lost to Xn influence as minority Xn communities, which cd not control them, preferred anything to their falling under the control of the larger churches; while hegemonic churches disdained to give the smaller denominations any stake in them." (246)
- 246.3 But if govt is non-religious then society is too, logically. "Since the political formation of society lies in its conscious self-ordering under God's govt, a soc-y conceived in abstraction is unformed by moral self-awareness, driven by internal dynamics rather than led by moral purposes." (246) 19th C sociology has this conception of society – "an acephalous organism, driven by unconscious forces from within, an object of study and, to the skilful, of manipulation, but in no sense a subject of responsible action." (246-7)
- 247.1 "Soc-y so conceived presents itself as a 'secular'. Reality." (247). It means by this, 'non-religious'. But "Within the traditional meaning of the term, of course, society as a whole cd never be secular. Secularity pertained only to certain functions within society which had their *raison d'être* in relation to this age (*saeculum*), not the next. The distinction of spiritual and secular was a distinction of two kinds of government within one society. There were not a spiritual and a secular society, only a society of the saved and a society of the damned." (247) But this "secular society" view thought of soc-y "as a quasi-mechanical system, incapable of moral and spiritual acts." (247) This is, of course, impossible:
"Is drug-taking, or sex with child prostitutes, a valid religious activity?
Can racial discrimination be practised to preserve the elect people of God or to safeguard religious caste?
May women be priests?
Must those in quest of employment benefit be prepared to accept work on Sundays or Saturdays?"
"Every actual society reaches answers to these questions which it treats as normative, and so makes definite religious judgments about the proper content of religious belief and practice. The false consciousness of the would-be secular society lies in its determination to conceal the religious judgments that it has made." *** (247)
- 247.2 What does this view of society do to "justice"? Well, there can be none – it's a religious issue. So instead of justice / natural law / right-wrong we have "rights" – and not objective rights – belong out there – but "subjective rights" i.e. those which are underived, original to the person etc. Law then becomes the adjudication between competing rights without any actual underpinning or set of absolute criteria behind the rights to which appeal can be made.
- 248.1 Which is not the same thing as a discussion of "individualism". ("Sociology itself developed as a reaction against indiv-m, insisting on the prior and inescapable reality of the 'social fact'" (248))
- 248.2 Medieval background of subjective rights
- 249.1 "The demoralised conception of society..." (249). What's needed is for political authority to resist demor-n and reassert transcendence/absolutes [DF – OOD uses neither term]

- 249.2 Which is a way of saying “no” to demoralised conception of society. “the concept of acephalous community is not a just or true one, and political theology is bound to replace it with a better. Here, too, the legacy of Xndom ... how society itself ... was understood. Early modern lib-m Implied not only lawful govt but a community susceptible to it; it comprised a set of expectations about how human beings might live together.” In other words, if have right view of govt then can’t have demoralised view of soc.
- 249.3 And this happens by a meeting of sense of law from above (there’s a right and wrong way of being political) and of law from below (there’s a right and wrong way of being social). These come together to overthrow demoralised conception of soc. Gt e.g. in Christmas Revolution of Romania, 1989.
- 250.1 Time to trace “the characteristic features of liberal society” (250). “Once again, we shall deploy the structural device of the four moments, in order to maintain the full evangelical shape of this social order against a tendency to reduce it to a single principle such as ‘liberty’” (250)
- 250.2 Enda McDonagh posits 4 “kingdom values” for society – justice, freedom, peace and truth. “Any one of them will become a mere slogan unless it is given content by the other three.” (250) His is a bit arbitrary (though v similar). OOD’s sees his 4 as necessary – “society is shaped by the Xn proclamation of the Christ who came, suffered, was restored and exalted.” (251)
- 251.1 Mind you, the only true and real ‘society’ is the church. “There is only one society which is incorporated into the Kingdom of God and which recapitulates the narrative of the Christ-event, and that is the church”. (251). But wider society reflects this – “Society shaped by the presence of the church forms a kind of penumbra to the church, a radiation of it rather than a participation in it. Society in this form has constantly been challenged and invited by the proclamation of the church; it has been heedful, but not wholly obedient; it has been claimed for the Kingdom but not sacramentally made part of it.” (251) So church and soc are “in a dialectical relation, distant from each other as well as identified.” (251)
- 251.2 Pattern seen before – the church is *bene esse* of society but wider society nevertheless still has the *esse*. Society, having been confronted with the true society of the church, cannot just revert, however – things can’t go backwards: “Having taken on the narrative form of the Christ-event, it cannot become unformed. The possibilities open to society with history and memory of the Gospel proclamation do not include naïve malevolence, but only a formation that is demonic to the extent that it is not redeemed and redemptive.” (251) Social evil where the gospel has been is not regression but rather “precisely misdirected progress, corrupt sophistication.” (252). Note that “the worst, and the most characteristically twentieth-century, evils of political experience have been progressive.” (252) The “worst menace and oppression [is] precisely in the cultural totality of late-modern liberalism.” (252)

Liberal society pp.252-271

1. Freedom
2. Mercy in judgment
3. Natural right
4. Openness to speech

- 252.1 1. Freedom. Gospel freedom is real freedom. Its structure? Freedom “grounded in the recognition of a superior authority which renders all authorities beneath it relative and provisional. We discover we are free when we are commanded by that authority which commands us according to the law of our being, disclosing the secrets of the heart. There is no freedom except when what we are, and do, corresponds to what has been given us to be and to do. ‘Given to us’, because the law of our being does not assert itself spontaneously merely by virtue of our existing. We receive ourselves from outside ourselves, addressed by a summons which evokes that correspondence of existence to being.” (252) !!!
- 253.1 Advent, freedom and Romans 13.7-10
- 253.2 This authority which brings freedom is an historical fact – “Christ the awaited King has come; he has assumed every structure of law and authority under his own command.” (253) “Our assertions about freedom, then, have a historical aspect. God has done something which makes it impossible for us any more to treat the authority of human society as final and opaque.” (253)
- 253.3 In Matthew this arrival means conflict – mission leads to conflict.
- 253.4 In Acts it constitutes a claim that the civil authorities have no right over it

- 254.1 And not just civil order. “Family and ethnic religion, too, are threatened by the summons of the gathering church.” (254)
- 254.2 Freedom and the individual. So freedom is not first about individuality. (“whether positively, in terms of indiv creativity and impulse, or negatively, in terms of ‘rights’, which is to say immunities from harm.” (254)). “Yet indiv liberty is not far away.” The implication is that an indiv “can no longer simply be carried within the social setting to which she or he was born; for that setting is under challenge from the new social centre.” (254) The indiv is called to give self to the Lord – in “differentiation from her family, tribe and nation, making decisions of discipleship which were not given her from within them.” (254). This itself requires an indiv free decision to be free. But this decision actually contributes to society’s freedom “because it allows her to enrich society by the gift of her self-donation to it. Indiv decision, the act of heart and mind, has now become fully and consciously engaged in and for society; so that society itself is free, being upheld by the free self-giving of each member. A society founded in conversion and baptism is a society unlike all others.” (254-55)
- 255.1 This is Gospel freedom. And “it has proved to be the foundation of a more generalised freedom, including a certain, not indefinite liberty for misguided and erroneous judgment.” (255). Fact is that each person “has (*has not is*) his own master, and his master is not the ruler who governs him in the order of civil society.” (255) This is (sort of) freedom of conscience. Not to believe what like. Not to ignore others. Not to be own master. Not to deny that there is right and wrong. But to say “there can be no separation of law and morality; but what there can be, and is, is a sphere of indiv responsibility before God in which the public good is not immediately at stake.” (255)
- 255.2 Note, too, that if gospel freedom is the paradigm then we move beyond the either-or of positive or negative freedom – of free from and free to. “An adequate description of freedom has points of affinity with both” (255) because gospel freedom has.
- 256.1 2. Mercy in judgment. Church suffers. Wider society (as penumbra) has sympathy (even while it may inflict the suffering!). Liberal society is marked by mercy in judgment.
- 256.2 Looks at first like “a complete abstention from judicial activity”. (e.g. John 8). But, no, resurrection shows that cross was both judgt and reconciliation.
- 257.1 Classical antiquity cdn’t address this. Judgt and mercy belonged to two sep worlds – judgt was a political thing.
- 257.2 And if mercy means remission of punishment but belongs to a world other than that of politics (which is ruled by judgt) then there can be no mercy. (Other than a ruler who is above law).
- 257.3 But if – Seneca – justice/judgt transcends compartmentalized world then it can talk to mercy. Then the problem, however, is how can it show mercy without being injustice?
- 258.1 Perhaps by punishing less (tempering justice) - that’s still injustice though. “The search for a way in which mercy may *temper* justice, then, reaches an impasse.
- 258.2 “This impasse is resolved only by Christological proclamation.” (258) “In the Christ-act mercy and judgment are united, but in their extremes, not by mutual qualification.” (258) How? ‘Johannine paradox that witness and judt are one and the same thing. This witness itself judges, by dividing mankind into those who accept it and those who reject it. So in Jesus’ witness to the Father there is judt and no judt at the same time. And that is the meaning of the adulteress story ... Jesus’ refusal to condemn does pronounce judt in a way, for her accusers leave the scene convicted.” (258)
- 259.1 So the cross, rather than undermining judgt, actually established/strengthened it. Cross was act of judt, remember. “The intelligibility of the secular auths in the res-n age depended on their being seen to carry forward what God had set himself to do. [judge evil]. The secular function in soc-y was to witness to divine judt by, as it were, holding the stage for it; the church, on the other hand, must witness to divine judt by no judt, avoiding litigation and swallowing conflict in forgiveness.” (259)
- 259.2 Church disc, remember, is not penal. But it is judt – it is a witness and divides right from wrong and says that wrong cannot be tolerated.
- 259.3 The church’s system of penitence (which arose out of recon-n purpose of disc) was taken too far when became a form of judicial/penal activity.

- 260.1 But how could secular justice be merciful? Not by the church's way – bringing people to repentance! Ask the church? 1. “When asked to say what that pointing [the secular power's pointing to mercy even as it exercised judgt] might consist of, Christian thinkers could only reply that it involved the restraint of force to the minimum necessary.” (260) 2. requiring the “interpreter of secular law to bring to the task virtues of mercy and humility” (260)
- 260.2 Various 16th C attempts to show what secular power showing mercy in judgt wd look like. E.g. Perkins on Phil 4.5 – “the nearness of divine judgt, final and immediate, demands of us a humble conduct in our justice as we hope to receive mercy from our judge” (all pretty vague, in other words).
- 261.1 Shakespeare has a pretty good go in *Measure for Measure* and *Merchant of Venice*. “They share one theme: the justice which is appropriate to the human community must be ‘merciful’ – and that precisely for the reason which Jesus gave to the accusers of the adulteress: it must be administered by sinners on sinners.” (261) But not mean no justice – Angelo deserves death – “An Angelo for Claudio, death for death” ... But victim Isabella saves Angelo. “The reshaping of justice by mercy cannot reach a final settlement, but will always be an ongoing dialectic in which the forgiveness of the wronged has a dynamic effect.” (Duke marries Isabella = liberal state marrying the church in order to keep on straight and narrow.)
- 262.1 3. Natural right. So Gospel creates a society and then the structures of the wider socy “were expected to defer to, and reflect, this evangelical humanity” (262)
- 262.1 4 things involved in humanity – call them “natural right”
 1. equality – “by which each human being may encounter another as a partner in humanity, neither slave nor lord
 2. structures of *affinity* – family, local comms etc
 3. *reciprocity* – the rels between 2 which respect 1.
 4. *creaturely cohabitation* with other species – not talk re this here because not part of the Xn pol trad-n to date
- 262.3 Equality “A substantial doctrine of equality must be capable of challenging some alleged distinctions which may be supposed to justify differences in the way in which we treat people”. (262) The extremes are “an equality before God without social implications” or “a totalising egalitarianism that is destructive of all forms of society”. (263) “To have any substance a claim for equality must reflect decisions about what differentiations are constructive and healthy for human existence and what are not ... which differentiations help and which hinder, the meeting of person with person on a basis of equality, with neither of them slave or lord.” (263) [DF this feels a bit waffly].
- 263.1 The church and equality – slavery always comes up.
- 263.2 Unhelpful consensus from beginning 20th C – “inner repudiation and outer acceptance” (i.e. church's response to slavery). No. “We need to be quite clear that Xns believed in an *outward*, social equality” (264)
- 264.1 Slavery as relatively benign economic instit-n which was part of the fabric of society
- 264.2 Thinking of “abolition of slavery” in that context is so anachronistic and thick-headed – like “abolition of money” [DF]. Was part of way whole thing worked. (Contrast colonial slavery which was not how that society and economy worked but was appended – wickedly – to it)
- 265.1 Lack of legal status also needs understanding – “The division between the private and the public realms was so sharply delineated that those whose roles confined them to the former had little or no standing in the latter.” (265) Slaves often compared to children in this respect – they were part of the household.
- 265.2 But instit-n changing by 2nd C – household less watertight unit and Stoic crit (// Xn crit) of ontolog inequality. Though this crit – “its tendency was not to propose alternative structures so much as to encourage philosophic distance from them and to encourage the cultivation of truly humane relationships in private.” (265)
- 265.3 Real Xn radicalism not here though – “It lies in the conviction that the church itself was a society without master or slave within it, and that this society of equals was so palpably real that the merely legal and economic relations of master and slave had only a shadowy reality beside it. Lactantius wrote: “Somebody will ask, ‘Are there not among you difference b/w poor and rich, b/w slave and master? Do you not have social distinctions?’ Not at all! Nor would we be able to use the term “brother” to one another if we did not believe that we were all equal.” (*Inst. Div.* 5.16) q 265

- 266.1 Raised issues of slaves and sacraments – where the two households overlapped. Slave need consent to marry? Become monk? Priest? Etc
- 266.2 So – “Life in the church provided the bridgehead for God’s rule over so, and social structures had to modify their demands before the experience and expectation of equality which life in the church fostered.” (266)
- Opposite with regard to humane structures / affinities. Here the point was that the church did not abolish them. There were still non-reciprocal relations.
- 266.3 Key example is the family. And Xn teaching on family is model for teaching on all these affinities. It affirms when under attack and criticises when it gets too absolute. “The church has witnessed to their humane claims, allowing them neither to be overridden nor to be exaggerated.” (267)
- 267.1 Vitoria on American Indians (1539) as example.
- 267.2 Universality / reciprocity. Ordered world peace. What form? Empire? Unified law? “The theological impulse behind the conception of international law is altogether superior to the theology of empire. It acknowledges the claim of Christ to be the sole ruler of the nations, and avoids erecting an icon of world-government in his place; yet his rule is not left as an empty ideal, but is given a clear institutional witness.” (267-8)
- 268.1 The form of this universality then – shd be “not that of a home but that of a meeting”. That way you don’t make non-reciprocity to be the ultimate form in which human beings confront one another. The “top” level shd not be an institution with powers but a meeting place with mutual respect. “It is essential to our humanity that there should always be foreigners, human beings from another community who have an alternative way of organising the task and privilege of being human, so that our imaginations are refreshed and our sense of cultural possibilities renewed.” (268)
- 268.2 4. Openness to speech.
- 268.3 Don’t forget the power of speech. Yes, force can extinguish it but “only at the cost of investing it with the dignity of martyrdom.” (269)
- 269.1 But again, civil soc-y not same as church. It reflects, echoes, is penumbra, takes own form. In church the voice of prophecy is by any and heard by all. Something of this in “democracy” in civil soc-y “in which one person’s voice may be heard to the same extent as another’s, where responsibilities are not so structured and assigned that deliberation about the public good is confined to a particular class of deliberators.” (269)
- 269.2 Of course, in theory “democracy” is about everybody having a share in ruling. Never. Is about the “special political class ... having its representative status clarified by stringent electoral procedures.” (270). But it is definitely that class that does the ruling. To cast a vote is not to rule.
- 270.1 No, the “heart of the matter [the essence of “democracy”] is a principle about access to public deliberations.” (270). “For this reason, the archetypal institution in the West is not the general election but the representative parliament, which, without itself governing, constitutes a forum of deliberation before which a govt is expected to explain itself and expose itself to critical interrogation.” (270) Parl-t “was not oriented to the administrative accomplishment of the ruler’s tasks, but to subjecting both the conception and the performance if those tasks to critical discussion in the light of fundamental qns about the common good.” (270)
- 270.2 This last - the openness of speech one - is the hardest of the four features of liberal society to maintain. To a large extent because the people aren’t interested in common good but only in their sectional interests. And so nations get the govts they deserve (As Greg the Gt said). “Liberal order will presumably never thrive within these islands until the work which Gregory undertook fourteen hundred years ago is resumed!” (271)

Modernity and menace pp.271-84

- 271.1 Modernity's critics see it as starting way back even though late modernity's features do appear quite new. (They are "its high level of technologisation, its sexual permissiveness, its voluntarisation of birth and death, its concept of politics as economic mgmt." (271))
- 271.2 How very difficult the history of ideas is. Trapped in that which we are trying to analyze.
- 272.1 Modernity needs criticism but how can we transcend it - it has set the guns for us.
- 272.2 We end up in massive generalisation and selectivity.
- 272.3 But we have got to try this "task at once impossible and inescapable" (273). "There is plenty to show that those who do not make an effort to read their times in a disciplined way read them all the same, but with narrow and parochial prejudice." (273). What are the disciplines "that good modernity-critics display: to see the marks of our time as the products of our past; to notice the danger civilisation poses to itself, not only the danger of barbarian reaction; to attend especially not to those features which strike our contemporaries as controversial, but to those which would have astonished an onlooker from the past but which seem to us too obvious to question." (273)
- 273.1 Anyway "to be alert to the signs of the times is a Gospel requirement." (273) Watching out for signs of Christ's coming and the Antichrist / ultimate conflict.
- 273.2 Identifying Antichrist is a serious business "There is no one Antichrist; but in any period of history Antichrist may take shape as one thing, challenging the claims of the Kingdom of God with its own." (273)

"When believers find themselves confronted with an order that, implicitly or explicitly, offers itself as the sufficient and necessary condition of human welfare, they will recognise the beast. When a political structure makes this claim, we call it 'totalitarian'. More subtle and more pernicious is the same claim made by a society or by a civilisation, in a series of self-interpreting doctrines which define metaphysical parameters for thought and action (even while innocently disavowing metaphysical intentions.) (274)

- 274.1 Key themes of modernity-criticism:
- a) existentialist, autonomous, self-creating humanism: "to put it theologically: the paradigm for the human presence in the world is creation *ex nihilo*, the absolute summoning of reason, order and beauty out of chaos and emptiness." (274)
- 274.2 b) "the traditional subservience of practical to theoretical reason is reversed." Pragmatic, utilitarian, manipulative everything "Set free from obedience to comprehensible ends of action confronting all reality as disposable material, its primary imperative is manipulation." (274)
- 274.3 c) 'Liberalism' - "a false posture of transcendence." (274)

And now – "arrange the key elements in a complementary narrative that parallels the narrative of liberal society that we sketched in the preceding section. This helps us understand at once how modernity is the child of Christianity ... and how modernity can be conceived as Antichrist, a parodic and corrupt devt of Christian social order." (275)

- 275.1 Key thing about this inverted, corrupted social order is that it is founded on a), b), and c) above and esp. a).
1. Freedom. "The point of departure is the moment of 'free' choice, indifferent and indeterminate. Rousseau, e.g., thinks free means "a state of pre-social and pre-moral individualism." (275). The roots of this lie "with the concept of free choice as a new beginning." (275) (blame Arminians for that). Also in "the myth of the social contract." (275) "So obviously is this myth unhistorical that it is easy to underestimate its hold on the modern mind." (275). But it makes the will of the free indiv the ultimate, the absolute - society is brought into existence by an act of such wills.
- 275.2 This is radical, selfish individualism. "the detached pre-social individual becomes the basic unit out of which society is then constructed ... he makes his appearance as a naked will, a pure originator." (276)
- 276.1 "Late-modern liberalism accordingly has followed the path of devaluing natural communities in favour of those created by acts of will." Families, neighbours - i.e. relationships which are "unchosen" are subordinated to voluntary associations. "Communities formed by blood-ties or by local contiguities are

thought to derogate from freedom, since they cannot be opted into from a position of indifference.” (276) “The very sense of being owned by family or some neighbourhood is an embarrassment to modern freedom.” (276). And justice, instead of being a given, is a matter of rights. And a right is “that liberty which each man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature.” (Hobbes, *Leviathan* 14) (276)

- 276.2 2. Suffering. If reorient soc-y to indiv wants then suffering becomes meaningless, unintelligible.
- 277.1 “Suffering ... is, by definition, the defeat of the will in sheer imposed experiencing.” **** (277) It doesn't come from our wills. But the only order arises from our wills. So it is unintelligible – something to be ranted against. (Can't come from God - a cruel God can't exist).
- 277.2 Punishment as form of unwilled suffering also makes no sense. “If right derives from compact, and punishment does not, punishment is unsupported by right.”(277)
- 277.3 Try ways of justifying punishment - it's a means to the end of reform or it's the triumph of the majority will. Once said latter then might is right: “Once society is thought of as an agreement between competing wills, the cloud of competition never lifts from it. Each new public endeavour serves as a further action in the war. To be punished is simply to have lost.”(278)
- 278.1 Which is why late-moderns are just altogether very uneasy about the whole idea of punishment. They always “suspect that a desire to see public justice done is a subtle and hypocritical way of securing one's own interests.” (278) Xn lib-m taught judges the hesitancy of true humility. “Ex-Christian lib-m inherited all the hesitancy; but, no longer grounded in religious humility, it becomes moral insecurity. From this springs the haunted unease with which the West views its own agents of law ...” (278) “When we punish we feel we have betrayed somebody. In effect we betray the unspoken promise that everyone's will for life and freedom will be satisfied.” (278)
- 278.2 3. Natural right. Instead of pre-existing natural law, justice etc. Now, right “was given a new derivation in the interest of individuals in their own self-preservation.” (278) Now believed that the only laws (between parties) are these which have, been created / agreed.
- 279.1 “Order had to be posited. It was a project to be imagined and carried into execution, not a gift to be received and appreciated ... created by political will or by arbitrary self-determination.” (279) e.g s absolute monarchs or acts of collective will. Will creates order - it is not natural.
- 279.2 Revolution. “Arbitrariness has been the nemesis of modern political order and consciousness of this has produced a dialectic of construction and destruction, in which successive efforts to found order upon will are overwhelmed by resentment. The modern age invented the concept of ‘revolution’, a reversion to the state of nature which would begin the whole task of construction *de novo*.” (279) In other words, keep having another go at making it solid. And the one remaining natural principle, the one thing never swept away, is equality. Not proper equality, allowing non-reciprocal rels but the atomistic, indiv, self-creator as equal with all others.
- 280.1 This form of ‘equality’ allows no “talk of subordination” - assumes that it compromises equality as such. Does allow that real equality “It can describe a functional precedence that is necessary or a given social purpose in a given social context (like the distinction between ‘first’ and ‘second’ violins in an orchestra.) But such a sympathetic reading is precluded by a prior commitment to the concept of equality as pre-social. To invoke it is to introduce the state of nature and to precipitate a revolutionary situation, intolerant of all orders that find themselves in place.” (280)
- 280.2 Feminism a good example of inability to understand the older concept of equality. “For a series of equivalences carry the argt irresistibly from the fact that women were assigned roles of subordination within various social structures to the conclusion that they were treated as unequal; and then, because equality is a state of nature constitutive for humanity, to the conc-n that their humanity was denied.” (280)
- 280.3 As a defence against revolution (since there is no natural order, justice to appeal to), the social sciences invent laws and forces and reifications in place of teleological natural law. As though these scientific laws were imposs to argue with. And better to have that than have to deal with competing arguing other wills.
- 281.1 4. Speech. “Modern society has striven to totalise speech.” (281). Era of mass comm-n. Speech is everything. (Ancients made actions more imp-t – hence warrior as hero). But not free speech in the Pentecost/church/true liberal society way. This is egalitarian and competitive speech.

- 281.2 Egalitarian: Prophecy both reinforced and qualified equality of speech. Reinforced because anyone might be a prophet. Qualified because not everyone was and the others had to shut up and listen.
- 282.1 But ...in corrupt liberal society there is the reinforcement of equality through speech (everyone is to be educated) without the qualification. Now all voices to be heard, no-one has to shut up, none are wiser than others.
- 282.2 “To extract the dissemination of information from the goal of wisdom is to promote a thoughtless knowledgablness, undercutting the ascetic and reflective disciplines which make wisdom possible.” (282) So now we have “amplifying to deafening level the dicta of an unreflective punditry.” (282)
- 282.3 Competitive: “speech has lost its orientation to deliberation on the common good and has come to serve the assertion of competing interests.” (282) Political speech is not an attempt to deliberate, to reason. It’s a competitive act of assertion.
- 283.1 “Within the parliamentary system the failure of the deliberative ideal is represented by the institution of the political party ... This has built into our expectations the idea that common deliberation is, in effect, no more than a condition of suppressed civil war.” (283)
- 283.2 Some hope will improve – “that equal and opposite irrationalities will, somehow, produce rationality as their Aristotelian mean.” (283) No. “The competitive communities of discourse ... are both sectarian in outlook and totalitarian in pretension.” (283) When speech is an assertion of will and nothing more than a weapon (never mind the content, the deliberation) then it has been “taken captive to will” and is really silence.
- 283.3 So then, these two ways of reading – “pair of counter-interpretations of modernity” – how see the narrative of the Christ-event in good and bad liberal society. Early-modern and late-modern. (Not in chron-l sequence, though.) The point? “The material of a civilisation’s mind is so complex that our readings of it must be heuristic, provisional, subject to changes of perspective.” (284) Exploratory exercise. “to interpret the two loves which made two cities.” “So the counter-narratives are not alternative but complementary.” (284) What’s wrong with “post-modern” analysis - makes it sound like it is a *fait accompli* and so fails to present us with the decision between two cities.

Epilogue pp.285-88

- 285.1 The ‘rest’ we look forward to is “a busy political affair”. “the tasks of cohabitation and ... the celebration of worship.” (285) Note the “civic character of its destiny ... a city that is the heart of a world, a focus of international peace; a city that is itself a temple ... that has overcome the antinomies of nature and culture, worship and politics, under an all-directing regime that needs no mediation; a city that has the universe within it, and yet has an ‘outside’ - not in the sense of an autonomous alternative, but of having all alternatives excluded, a city with a Valley of Hinnom.”(285)
- 285.2 And the church? “Never was, in its true character, merely the temple of the city; it was the promise of the city itself.” (285) Eternal goal is disclosure of the church as a city. Intermediate goal is understanding the city through the prism of the church.
- 286.1 So the task of a political ethics to build on this political theology? “Pol-l ethics has to carry forward into detailed deliberation the principle established by political theology: authority is reordered towards the task of judgment.” (286)
- Judgment, justice need exploring. Relation of various govt-l tasks judgmt . Other elements of polit-l auth in rel to judgt. E.g. Power - relates to judgment through just-war theory. How does “tradition” relate to judgt? “the architecture of a Christian doctrine of society has yet to be established”. Look at diff sorts of communication which are relevant - locality, econ, education, family.
- 286.2 But finish by looking towards the eternal goal.
1. Still looking (it is called Jerusalem/Zion after all) to the proper winning/restoring of Israel
- 287.1 Because modern Israel is hardly the real thing, is it? (Yet)
- 287.2 2. “the heavenly Jerusalem is disclosed through an act of judgment.” (287) (of war and of judicial declaration). “It closes history, in the sense that history is composed of the witness of the faithful against infidelity, but it does not in any sense close time.” (287)

- 287.3 3. Speaking of *possession* not tradition when looking at eternal goal. Now the only possession is through tradition (we received and pass on and sometimes, synchronously, we share around). “The final realisation of a civic identity can occur only as past generations, who have handed on their goods and identity to later generations, are restored to be full sharers again.” (287) “The secret guilt which infects every culture’s thoughts about its ancestors ... must be overcome.” (288) “The resurrection of the dead ... is the condition of true politics.” (288)
- 288.1 “And so, too, of political theology” ... must “stand self-consciously before that horizon.” (288)